Raisi’s Death Exposes Scarcity of Iranian Leaders
The event was in many ways a showcase of the proficiency of Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahanian.
A year earlier, Iran and Azerbaijan were on the brink of war. Now, Raisi and Abdollahanian stood across from their Azeri counterparts, and the Iranian president proclaimed: “This heartfelt relationship between the two countries and the two nations is unbreakable,” as they inaugurated a jointly constructed dam.
Within a few hours, both Iranian leaders, along with the governor of the local province and head imam at the region’s central mosque, were dead. The thick fog and shoddy state of Iranian equipment (a separate helicopter crash last year nearly killed the Sports Minister) make accidental death the likeliest explanation. To drive home the point, former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has blamed the United States, not for an assassination, but for failing to sell Iran helicopter parts.
The death of Raisi leaves Iran without its presumed heir to Supreme Ayatollah Ali Khamenei even as it confronts considerable challenges at home and abroad. Raisi’s three-year presidency saw the total marginalization of the reformist faction within the government, all but guaranteeing the next president would continue down the hardline path preferred by Khamenei. But this has pushed Iran to its limits. Another four years may be too many.
Ebrahim Raisi came to power with a reputation shaped by his execution of 5,000 political prisoners and the ruthless crackdown on liberal protests in 2009. The ayatollahs had cleared the lane for him, banning all serious reformist challengers from running, so that he could deal with the turmoil shaking the country. Under the previous administration, benefits from the lifting of US sanctions flowed almost exclusively to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with the resulting spike in fuel and food prices leading to the largest protests the Islamic Republic had ever witnessed.
Raisi’s presidency simply continued the trend. As he deepened ties with Russia, Moscow’s full-scale invasion of 2022 sent food prices soaring again and protestors back into the streets. Raisi’s administration blocked the media and internet and began killing protestors. That offered only a temporary reprieve, as morality police killed a young Kurdish blogger later that year, sparking an even larger protest movement, with protestors in major cities calling for women’s rights and in Kurdish and Baloch regions on Iran’s frontiers, calling for autonomy. The regime, nothing if not predictable, sent the riot squads and Basij paramilitary thugs to tear into the demonstrators. Hundreds more died.
It didn’t stop the protests. Last year, Iranians took to the streets another 2,000 times mostly for labor and trade demonstrations as corruption and a sclerotic economy continued to rob Iranians of a brighter future.
There are very serious foreign problems too. Iran has invested heavily to extend its influence from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea through proxies in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon and recently launched its first direct attack on Israel. This robs the country of resources to use at home and generates anger among many Iranians more concerned with bread-and-butter issues than imperial adventures.
Managing an extensive and dangerous foreign policy while keeping the peace at home is a tricky balance to manage at the best of times, but harder when senior politicians and military leaders die or are killed by Israel.
So the regime needs a man (and it will be a man) of some skill and refinement. It’s far from clear that the candidates for that post will be able to meet the moment (though others may yet emerge.)
The new favorite to win the presidency, interim President Mohammad Mokhbar, 68, is an exemplar of the current regime, its murky financial dealings, and its reliance on backroom bureaucrats. He long served as the head of Setad, an organization that putatively helps the needy, but mostly lives off the confiscated wealth of the regime’s enemies. Setad is infamous for its corruption, acting as a vast multi-billion dollar fund controlled by the supreme leader.
Joining Mokhbar in an interim presidential council is Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, the head of Iran’s parliament, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and a perennial candidate for president. As mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf allegedly covered up the embezzlement of $3bn from municipal coffers by IRGC generals. He has struggled to maintain unity in the Prinicipalist (hardliner) coalition that rules parliament and may face challenges from other hardliners should he run, as he did in this year’s legislative elections.
The Reformist, or moderate, camp has been eviscerated by bans on candidates since Raisi’s election. Their leading candidates in the upcoming election, former president Hassan Rouhani and former head of parliament Ali Larijani are likely to face significant bureaucratic hurdles in addition to a demoralized base if they are even allowed to run.
The death of Raisi presents a chance for the regime to change course; it shows almost no interest in doing so. The most significant threats to the regime are internal, and all a result of the incompetence, corruption, and antagonization that has led to economic growth falling by about a third since its 2012 peak. The leading candidates are all exemplars of these pathologies. After all, they would not otherwise have reached such senior positions.
While the new president won’t represent a change in the Islamic Republic’s policy, he will continue to push the Iranian people’s tolerance for corruption to its limit. With no signs of unrest dissipating, the ayatollahs and their allies are playing a deeply dangerous game.
Ben Dubow is a Non-resident Fellow at CEPA and the founder of Omelas, which tracks authoritarian influence online.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
The post Raisi’s Death Exposes Scarcity of Iranian Leaders appeared first on CEPA.