A plan to address political violence before Election Day

The American electorate goes to the polls to exercise its franchise this fall, as it has more than a hundred times since 1788. But not since 1968 — a tumultuous year marked by assassinations, division and widespread rioting — has the threat of political violence loomed as large as it does today.

The attempted assassination of former President Trump is still fresh in America’s collective memory. The deadly Capitol riot seeking to undo the result of the nation’s last presidential vote is not far removed. And political polarization and angry rhetoric are the new normal.

But even at this late date, less than three months before Election Day, steps can be taken to make the election season safer. And even more can be done now to reduce the risk of election-related violence in coming years.

Earlier this spring, a small circle of active and former senior law enforcement officers, intelligence officials, national security analysts and legal scholars participated in a workshop to discuss the country’s readiness to deal with political violence during the forthcoming elections. 

The result is “Addressing the Threat of Political Violence in the 2024 Elections,” a 70-page summary report I wrote that serves as both a warning and a playbook for those charged with overseeing public safety at the federal, state and local levels.

If they aren’t already, authorities should be collecting intelligence and devising plans for a range of possible disruptive scenarios. These could include attacks on — or abductions of — candidates, major public disturbances like riots, actions aimed at disrupting voting like cyberattacks or attacks on critical infrastructure as well as bombings, arsons, shootings or other violence at or near polling places.

That the 2024 election could devolve into violence is hardly a surprise. Last time around, in 2020, there were widespread protests, localized clashes, a plot to kidnap a governor and ultimately, the attempted disruption of the electoral vote count at the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021.

Since then, as written in the report, America’s “national antagonisms have not been resolved. They have been clung to, preserved, displayed and brought out to again fuel our fury.”

Participants in the workshop were concerned about rhetoric that borders on incitement, the exploitation of social media platforms to deepen differences and promote extremism and the unprecedented level of influence operations by foreign adversaries, including Russia, Iran, China and North Korea.

Mostly, though, they were concerned that election violence could erode confidence in the electoral process and lead to widespread cynicism and indifference. This “would further divide us at home and weaken us abroad, at a time when the world has become more dangerous.”

So, what can be done? At the federal, state and local level, planning and preparation could go a long way toward protecting candidates, election workers, voters and the electoral process that is at the heart of American democracy.

Full-time election safety task forces should be assembled at the state and federal levels to devise means to respond to potential disruptions. Response teams should be made ready to assemble as needed. 

These efforts should draw on the resources and expertise of election officials, law enforcement, government personnel and other potential enforcement assets like the National Guard.

All this should be coordinated via state-level fusion centers devoted to assembling, assessing and communicating threat developments to governors, state task forces and crisis response teams. These centers could also involve cyber teams, red-teaming, table-top simulations and field training exercises.

Drawing on the fusion centers’ work and a reexamination of existing law, playbooks could guide authorities from the state level down to the polling station level. Chains of command should be established, public hotlines set up and press strategies devised.

The work of these groups should be networked to share intelligence, information and warnings, as well as best practices. 

Still, little progress is possible unless America acknowledges that political violence has been, and will continue to be, a feature of its political landscape. Assassinations, armed assaults and gun battles, bombings, race riots and massacres were not uncommon during elections in the 19th century. These trends continued at various levels through the turbulent 1960s up until the present day. 

Eight out of the 21 presidents elected since 1900 — more than one-third — have been shot or shot at. Two were killed.

The steps outlined above can help make American elections safer, but law enforcement can do little to end the threat if Americans cannot agree on the importance of ridding the process of violence, fear and intimidation.

Ultimately, protecting the fundamental right of Americans to vote safely will require a commitment from the electorate writ large. Democracy can only truly be preserved if Americans reject violence and those who promote it.

Brian Michael Jenkins is a senior adviser to the president of RAND. He is the author of numerous books, reports and articles, including “Addressing the Threat of Political Violence in the 2024 Elections.”