A flawed peacemaker: Jimmy Carter was wrong on Hamas and Israel
Jimmy Carter’s legacy is one of complexity and contradictions. As a one-term president who struggled with domestic and international challenges, Carter’s post-presidential life brought him renewed admiration for his humanitarian efforts, earning him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002. Yet it is impossible to overlook a deeply troubling aspect of his legacy: his role as an apologist for Hamas and his often counterproductive interventions in Middle Eastern politics, particularly concerning Israel.
Carter’s presidency marked a pivotal moment in American diplomacy in the Middle East. His greatest achievement in this arena was the Camp David Accords, which established a historic peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. This diplomatic breakthrough demonstrated Carter’s ability to mediate complex disputes and his commitment to peaceful resolutions. However, his vision of the Middle East — one that sought to hold Israel and its adversaries equally accountable — often betrayed a naivete about the realities of the region’s politics.
As president, Carter’s approach to Israel was marked by a tone of moral equivalence. While he correctly identified the importance of Palestinian self-determination, his administration’s rhetoric often failed to adequately differentiate between the challenges faced by a democratic state like Israel and the actions of its authoritarian adversaries. Carter’s approach laid the groundwork for the more problematic stances he would take in his post-presidential years.
After leaving office, Carter dedicated himself to human rights advocacy through the Carter Center, an institution that has undeniably contributed to global health, democracy promotion and conflict resolution. However, when it came to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Carter’s interventions often crossed the line from constructive criticism to outright partisanship.
His 2006 book “Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid” drew widespread condemnation for its inflammatory title and its one-sided portrayal of the conflict. By using the term “apartheid” to describe Israel’s policies, Carter not only alienated many of Israel’s supporters but also undermined his credibility as a mediator. The term, laden with historical connotations, falsely equated Israel’s security measures with the systemic racial segregation of South Africa, ignoring the context of terrorism and existential threats faced by the Jewish State.
Carter’s most egregious misstep, however, was his engagement with Hamas, which is designated as a terrorist group by the U.S., the European Union and other entities. In meetings with Hamas leaders, Carter sought to portray the group as a legitimate political actor, advocating for their inclusion in peace negotiations. Dialogue is an essential part of conflict resolution, but Carter’s approach seemed to overlook Hamas’s explicit commitment to Israel’s destruction and its long record of violence against civilians. His calls for understanding and engagement often lacked a corresponding emphasis on the necessity for Hamas to renounce terrorism and recognize Israel’s right to exist.
Carter’s defense of Hamas extended beyond his personal meetings. He frequently criticized Israeli policies while downplaying or ignoring the provocations and atrocities committed by Hamas. This imbalance undermined his moral authority and contributed to the perception that he was more interested in vilifying Israel than in fostering a genuine peace process. By providing a platform for Hamas without demanding reciprocal commitments to peace, Carter’s actions emboldened an organization that thrives on perpetuating conflict.
Even more troubling was Carter’s apparent lack of recognition of the broader ideological and geopolitical dynamics underpinning the conflict. His framing often reduced the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to a binary of oppressor and oppressed, ignoring the role of other actors such as Iran in funding and arming groups like Hamas. This simplification not only distorted the realities on the ground but also weakened the prospects for a balanced resolution. Carter’s rhetoric frequently omitted the systemic indoctrination and incitement perpetuated by Palestinian leadership, which fosters a culture of resistance to peace and coexistence.
To his credit, Carter’s critiques of Israel were not without merit in certain respects. Like any democratic government, Israel is not beyond reproach, and its policies — particularly in the context of settlement expansion and the treatment of Palestinians — deserve scrutiny. But Carter’s unrelenting focus on Israel’s faults, coupled with his willingness to engage with and legitimize its most implacable enemies, skewed the conversation in ways that hindered constructive dialogue.
Carter’s defenders argue that his positions reflected a deep commitment to peace and justice. Indeed, there is no reason to doubt his sincerity. But sincerity alone does not absolve one of the consequences of their actions. By failing to fully appreciate the asymmetry between a democratic state defending itself against terrorism and an organization committed to that state’s annihilation, Carter’s advocacy often did more harm than good. His approach risked legitimizing violence and exacerbating tensions, rather than paving the way for a lasting resolution.
As we consider Carter’s contributions to history, we should honor his dedication to humanitarian causes while critically examining the ways in which his approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fell short. Carter’s life was a testament to the power of individual action to effect change, but it also serves as a cautionary tale about the limits of idealism when confronted with the harsh realities of international politics.
Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington, D.C.