A predator state
PAKISTAN appears to fit the definition of a ‘predator state’ which, according to economist James K. Galbraith, is “a political system in which a narrow band of elites uses policy instruments for its own benefit, while the rest of the population foots the bill”.
That is exactly the reason for the unravelling of the state. What is happening in Balochistan and KP is a symptom of a failing state.
However, the army chief wants the country to be “a hard state” in order to fight adversaries within and outside. He is unhappy at the worsening state of governance in the country. “How long will we continue to fill governance gaps with the sacrifices of the Pakistan Army and the blood of martyrs?” he asked the political leadership at a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security. His concerns may sound convincing. But the real question is, how have we come to this stage, with two strategically located provinces in the grip of insurgencies, which present an existentialist threat?
What does it mean to turn the country into a ‘hard state’ and how will that help strengthen national security? It is wrong to imagine that the use of coercive power can ensure peace in the country. That is exactly what we have resorted to in Balochistan for the past several decades. But it has only aggravated the situation. Militant violence has spread like wildfire and is proving hard to extinguish merely by employing coercive power.
Militancy cannot be fought when the population feels alienated. Life in large parts of Balochistan has come to a virtual halt following the strike called by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee in protest against the wide crackdown in the province and the arrest of its leaders. Instead of finding a political solution, the state is resorting to brutal measures that will only worsen the festering public discontent.
What we are witnessing is an unaccountable state that has lost the trust of its own people.
Treating growing public discontent against oppression as a law-and-order matter is an abdication of political responsibility. For sure, the use of force may help create periods of relative peace, but unless the causes of deep discontent in the population are addressed, the violence can take on ever more virulent forms, which would require another round of intensified coercive power to tackle. In fact, the nation is paying with the blood of the martyrs for a mindless and repressive policy pursued over the years.
What has been happening in Balochistan is the result of the denial of even the basic rights of the populace. The country’s biggest province (in terms of land) is locked in an escalating cycle of violence with militarisation and the suppression of fundamental civil liberties and human rights. The recurring use of the state’s coercive instruments is not a sign of authority but of weak governance. It’s not surprising that the situation in Balochistan continues to deteriorate as more coercive measures are adopted.
A state can only earn the loyalty of its citizens when it is seen to represent the popular will. A repressive and authoritarian state loses all credibility. It becomes weak, even if it has powerful instruments and agents of coercion. Its relentless use of force and exploitation to suppress democratic demands creates potential ‘enemies within’. The state’s vulnerabilities increase and are exploited by hostile external forces. A predatory state cannot expect the support of its citizenry.
In fact, it’s a sign of weakness and insecurity when a state resorts to hard power against its own people. An insecure state sees every citizen as a potential rival who is conspiring with outside enemies. A state fearful of its own citizens and armed with the most powerful instruments of coercion becomes a threat to its own survival. It turns into a predatory state, which is not constrained by the rule of law or subjected to strict accountability through strong and independent institutions.
A state becomes strong not by usurping people’s fundamental rights but by allowing itself to be held accountable by those it claims to represent. What we are witnessing is an unaccountable state that has lost the trust of its own people. Most of Pakistan’s security challenges arise from the increasing gap between the state and the people. It is indeed a soft state presenting a system that has virtually broken down.
The ruling civilian dispensation, led by the security establishment, is wrecking state institutions. With the higher judiciary being stripped of its independence there is not even a semblance of the rule of law in the country. The legitimacy of the regime that has come to power through an establishment-supported, manipulated vote lies in tatters. With the two provinces under virtual siege the future of the federation is in jeopardy.
What has made the situation even more precarious is the increasing discontent in Sindh thanks to a unilateral decision by the regime to construct six canals to irrigate desert land in Punjab. The political and economic domination of Punjab has weakened the federation.
True, we should be concerned about the role of outside forces in terrorism inside Pakistan, but it is mainly state failure that has created a conducive situation for this foreign interference. The call for retaliation with military force when such cross-border terrorism takes place does not make sense when we cannot fix things at home. Any such cross-border military action cannot be regarded as a feature of a hard state if that state is not capable of addressing the grievances of its own people.
A ‘hard state’ refers to a government that effectively implements policies, maintains strong control, and prioritises national interest. But do we have a clear policy to win the trust of the people beyond the use of coercive power? A predatory state neither represents the interest of the people nor works for their welfare. Whatever we are doing in Balochistan is the manifestation of a colonial mindset. There is not much time left to pull back from the brink and save the federation.
The writer is an author and journalist.
X: @hidhussain
Published in Dawn, March 26th, 2025