‘South Asian Quad?’
THE concept of ‘minilateralism’ is relatively new in international politics. In an evolving global environment, states are avoiding hardcore military alliances and embracing like-minded countries for issue-based cooperation. Some recent examples of such alliances are the Quad in the Indo-Pacific region and I2U2 in the Middle East. Pakistan seems to have learned this lesson and is following a similar path to secure its interests in the South Asian region.
During May and June, Pakistan, with China’s help, established stronger cooperation with two important regional countries — Afghanistan and Bangladesh. While the Strategic Dialogue Forum of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan was established a decade ago, it has gained prominence recently due to regional geopolitical dynamics. In May, the trilateral dialogue culminated in improved diplomatic ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Similarly, in June, Bangladesh, China and Pakistan held trilateral talks, during which they pledged to enhance cooperation in various spheres. It seems Pakistan is eager to establish a ‘South Asian Quad’ — a forum fundamentally immune to Indian interventions.
Why is Pakistan eager to establish minilateral forums? There are several considerations that have pushed Islamabad to adopt minilateralism as an important pillar of its foreign policy in South Asia.
First, Islamabad is concerned about Saarc’s ineffectiveness. This South Asian forum for regional cooperation has not held a summit-level meeting for over a decade. New Delhi’s decision to boycott the summit in Islamabad, and later, its consistent refusal to revive Saarc, dashed Islamabad’s hopes for regionalism. Furthermore, New Delhi’s eagerness to strengthen Bimstec as a parallel to Saarc pushed Pakistan to seek options beyond the South Asian forum.
Second, in contrast to major regional organisations, minilateral forums deliver quick results, because they are generally established for specific issues. The trilateral forum of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan has achieved several milestones in the recent past. China has agreed to build the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan railway project. This strategic forum has also helped mitigate irritants between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These successes have encouraged Pakistan to push for a similar forum with Bangladesh.
Minilateral forums deliver quick results.
Third, Islamabad considers China a stabilising factor in South Asia. Beijing’s ability to challenge Indian influence in South Asia has been viewed positively by Islamabad. Beijing’s role in South Asia has been significantly enhanced during the past decade. Except for Bhutan and India, all South Asian countries are signatories to the Belt and Road Initiative. China has pledged over $100 billion in these countries in various capacities. Therefore, Beijing has greater stakes in South Asia. Previously, Pakistan had proposed China as a dialogue partner of Saarc, but India rejected the idea. In Saarc’s absence, Pakistan is free to bring Beijing into the South Asian equation.
Fourth, the regional geopolitical environment is also conducive for such a forum. In 2016, India’s boycott of the Saarc summit in Islamabad was supported by Afghanistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Today, the altered domestic political environment of these countries has changed their attitude towards Pakistan. Bangladesh’s leadership has repeatedly echoed its desire for Saarc’s revival. Pakistan’s proactive approach, growing calls for Saarc’s revival by member states, and India’s refusal to revive Saarc have created fertile ground for alternative forums.
Naturally, New Delhi is concerned about these developments in its neighbourhood. For New Delhi, creating such forums would be tantamount to its ‘strategic encirclement’. New Delhi has always viewed South Asia as its primary sphere of influence, and China’s growing influence in the region is a major concern for it. Although New Delhi could repair its ties with smaller South Asian states if it wanted to, the temptation of economic and strategic cooperation with the China-Pakistan duo might be too much to ignore.
Whether China and Pakistan continue to engage South Asian states —excluding New Delhi — by establishing strategic dialogue forums or create a ‘South Asian Quad’, the major concern will remain the sustainability of such a platform. In Bangladesh’s case, the interim government seems eager to be part of such forums, but will the next elected government there continue to cooperate with similar enthusiasm? Secondly, New Delhi’s strategic reaction to such arrangements will also determine the future prospects of such forums. However, for now, time is on Pakistan’s side and Islamabad is seizing this strategic moment.
The writer is an analyst of South Asian affairs. The views expressed are his own.
Published in Dawn, July 8th, 2025