A new Pakistan
THE recent standoff with India in May has suddenly recalibrated Pakistan’s global image, offering it a rare moment of diplomatic and strategic ascendancy. Once struggling on the geo-economic front, Islamabad has found renewed space in the geopolitical theatre, not just as a reactive player, but as one redefining its regional and global bearings.
The conflict, while perilous, proved to be an inadvertent diplomatic windfall for Pakistan. New Delhi’s narrative on terrorism, long used to isolate Islamabad, now appears increasingly unconvincing, especially in the absence of credible evidence following the Pahalgam incident. Pakistan’s measured yet forceful military response surprised many observers and signalled a new strategic confidence. At the same time, the quiet revival of security ties with Washington added another layer to Islamabad’s growing diplomatic leverage.
Amid this recalibration, several factors stand out. China remains Pakistan’s foremost strategic partner, followed closely by Turkiye. Equally critical are the country’s untapped mineral reserves, now drawing renewed international attention. Afghanistan’s evolving landscape and Pakistan’s counterterrorism gains have further enhanced its profile in regional security conversations. Pakistan’s diplomacy during the Iran-Israel conflict also added to its strengths.
These shifts are set within a rapidly transforming geopolitical environment that spans the Middle East, South Asia, and the Caucasus. Islamabad’s diplomatic overtures are now reaching deeper into Central Asia and even into South Asia’s periphery, particularly Bangladesh. With growing disenchantment toward India and Russia’s increasingly transactional regional posture, Pakistan finds itself in a position to cultivate new alliances, provided it can maintain strategic coherence.
The current geopolitical environment is shifting in Pakistan’s favour.
Yet, this emerging external opportunity is contingent on internal consolidation. To sustain its newfound geopolitical relevance, Pakistan must stabilise its domestic front economically, politically, and institutionally. Without internal strength, diplomatic gains risk becoming transient. Pakistan has come to the critical realisation that sustaining recent strategic and diplomatic gains requires a more effective and evolved counterterrorism strategy. This urgency was underscored last week when the military leadership emphasised the need for “decisive and holistic actions at all levels” against all shades of terrorist groups.
Currently, Pakistan is engaged in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in Balochistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa border regions adjoining Afghanistan — efforts that international actors have acknowledged. However, what continues to be a point of vulnerability, and what India persistently exploits, is the lingering presence of banned groups that were once active in India-administered Kashmir, particularly Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). In recent years, Pakistan has taken concrete steps to dismantle these networks, mainly in response to FATF requirements and sustained diplomatic pressure, especially from Washington and European capitals.
Despite these measures, India continues to assert that elements of these groups remain active within Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. It has effectively used this narrative to shape international opinion, particularly in Western policy circles, and has shown little indication of abandoning this diplomatic tool. However, it is increasingly evident that sustaining such a posture requires not only rhetoric but also viable alternatives. If India’s narrative begins to lose traction without credible evidence or renewed justification, it may be compelled to recalibrate its approach, potentially opening space for dialogue on more equal terms.
The latest reports submitted by India and Pakistan to FATF reveal contrasting approaches toward addressing terrorism financing. While Pakistan’s submission reflects a structured and institutionally grounded effort, India’s input appears more selective and strategically framed to serve its ongoing narrative.
India’s contributions are included in sections related to in-kind methods, the misuse of e-commerce platforms, and the use of online payment services and VPNs to fund lone-actor terrorism. India provided two case studies; first, about an attempted attack on April 3, 2022, at the Gorakhnath Temple, and second, the February 2019 suicide bombing of an Indian security convoy, which resulted in the deaths of 40 soldiers. Notably, the FATF report did not reference the Pahalgam incident, nor did it express any concern about Pakistan’s compliance status.
In the case studies presented by India, the sources of the findings are not transparently identified. In contrast, Pakistan’s case studies, focusing on the TTP and IS-K, detail how these groups exploit informal banking systems and engage in kidnapping-for-ransom to generate funds. Crucially, Pakistan’s submissions cite the National Counter Terrorism Authority as the source of the intelligence, lending greater credibility to its inputs.
The contrast between the two approaches is telling. While India continues to weaponise narratives for diplomatic leverage, Pakistan is slowly repositioning itself through institutional credibility and regulatory compliance. In a shifting geopolitical landscape, such measured engagement is likely to yield more sustainable dividends.
Indian media outlets have misrepresented FATF’s findings, selectively quoting from the latest report to falsely suggest that Pakistan is not in compliance. FATF has neither issued any warning against Pakistan nor expressed dissatisfaction with its current level of compliance. On the contrary, Pakistan’s counterterrorism financing efforts have been acknowledged and appreciated by FATF member states.
Interestingly, as India’s counterterrorism narrative loses its international traction, Pakistan appears to be adopting a similar approach, attributing almost every act of terrorism on its soil to Indian involvement. Rather than playing to India’s rhetorical framework, Pakistan would be better served by charting its own strategic course. The current geopolitical environment is shifting in Pakistan’s favour. To fully capitalise on this, Pakistan must remain focused on dismantling terrorism and insurgency through sustained, credible efforts. This, more than counter-narratives alone, will demonstrate a meaningful difference to the world.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, July 13th, 2025