Beyond The Hasina Doctrine: A Call For Strategic Realism In India-Bangladesh Relations – OpEd
For nearly two decades, the view of Bangladesh from the corridors of power in New Delhi was framed through a singular, comforting lens: the indispensable partnership with Sheikh Hasina. Under her leadership, the “Golden Chapter” of bilateral ties saw unprecedented cooperation in counter-terrorism, connectivity, and the stabilizing of India’s restless Northeast. However, the dramatic collapse of her government in August 2024, followed by the current escalating friction between the two neighbors, suggests that this “Hasina Doctrine”—the outsourcing of India’s neighborhood policy to a single political ally—has reached a dead end.
The recent diplomatic spats, triggered by the extradition demands for Hasina and the tragic cycles of protest and communal tension, are not merely “isolated noise.” They are symptoms of a deeper crisis: India’s struggle to reconcile its strategic interests with the democratic aspirations of a changing Bangladesh.
The Myth of the Monolithic Extremist
The first and most critical step in this recalibration is to stop viewing the popular uprising in Bangladesh through the reductive prism of “Islamic extremism.” For too long, Indian policy circles and sections of the media have conflated any opposition to the Awami League with the rise of radicalism. While there are undoubtedly fringe elements and Islamist groups seeking to exploit the current vacuum, characterizing a mass movement led by students and civil society as a purely communal or extremist phenomenon is both a factual error and a strategic blunder.
The “July Revolution” was, at its core, a demand for accountability, economic justice, and the restoration of a hollowed-out democratic process. By dismissing these grievances as "extremist-driven," New Delhi risks alienating a whole generation of Bangladeshis who do not identify with radical ideologies but are deeply resentful of what they perceive as India’s unconditional support for an increasingly autocratic regime. To build a sustainable relationship, India must learn to distinguish between legitimate political dissent and genuine security threats. If we continue to treat the Bangladeshi people’s quest for sovereignty as a threat to our own, we will only ensure that the anti-India sentiment we fear becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Moving Toward “Strategic Restraint”
The current atmosphere is undeniably volatile. Reports of violence against minorities in Bangladesh and inflammatory rhetoric regarding India’s "Seven Sisters" have understandably raised alarms in New Delhi. Conversely, the perception in Dhaka that India is a "safe house" for the former Prime Minister fuels a narrative of Indian interference. In this "trust deficit" environment, both sides must exercise extreme restraint.
The summoning of envoys and the suspension of visa services may serve as immediate diplomatic signals, but they do little to address the underlying friction. India must resist the temptation to use its economic and geographic leverage as a blunt instrument. Similarly, the interim government in Dhaka, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, must recognize that its primary responsibility is to maintain internal order and protect all its citizens, regardless of faith, to prevent the bilateral relationship from sliding into an irreversible chill.
The Path to February 2026
The true test of this relationship lies in the upcoming national elections, scheduled for February 2026. For fifteen years, New Delhi was accused of putting all its eggs in one basket. The results of that policy are now visible. The path forward requires a transition from “patronage” to “partnership.”
Looking ahead, the path toward the national elections scheduled for February 2026 offers a vital window for a transition from a policy of “patronage” to one of “partnership.” This period should be utilized to broaden the scope of engagement, moving beyond a traditional reliance on a single political entity. Diplomacy can focus on opening robust channels of communication with a wider spectrum of stakeholders, including major opposition parties, professional bodies, and civil society leaders. By signaling a clear readiness to work constructively with whatever administration emerges from a free and credible election, a foundation of respect for the democratic mandate can be established.
This evolution in approach suggests that regional interests are best served by a stable and legitimate government in Dhaka, regardless of its political affiliation. Furthermore, re-centering the conversation on structural issues—such as equitable water-sharing agreements and humane border management—will likely yield more long-term goodwill than high-level political posturing. Addressing these “bread and butter” concerns demonstrates a commitment to the welfare of the people, which remains the most resilient bridge between the two nations.
India and Bangladesh are tied together by more than just 4,000 kilometers of border; they are bound by shared rivers, integrated markets, and a history that began with a common struggle for liberation. A stable, democratic, and prosperous Bangladesh is not just a “nice-to-have” for India; it is a strategic necessity.
The era of the “Hasina Doctrine” is over. What must replace it is a more nuanced, people-centric diplomacy that respects Bangladesh's sovereignty and its internal political transformation. By treating our neighbor as an equal partner rather than a junior client, India can turn the current crisis into an opportunity to build a more resilient and genuine friendship. The upcoming elections offer a chance for a fresh start. It is a chance that neither New Delhi nor Dhaka can afford to waste.