Kashmir In The Early-‘60s: Keeping Pro-Pakistan Elements At Bay – Analysis

By Sandeep Bamzai

Bakshi vs Sadiq: The Lines Are Drawn

In 1962 as palace intrigues returned to the forefront in J&K, the simmering rivalry between Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and G.M. Sadiq resurfaced, fiercer than ever, with both pursuing separate agendas that remained oddly connected by invisible lines. Sadiq was driven by the lure of the chair, while Bakshi was intent on remaining firmly ensconced in it. There was no moral metric to this pursuit of power. The old combatants circled familiar tropes, the laws kept shifting, battle lines were redrawn, and the uneasy truce was upended.

The Sadiq faction and the Government of India, which viewed the ongoing conflict unfavourably, were deeply troubled by corruption charges against Bakshi’s brother Majid and his son Bashir. Growing increasingly isolationist and feeling besieged, Bakshi opened a new front as a diversionary tactic. After Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru told Bakshi on 25 March 1962 that the J&K government's reputation had to remain unimpeachable, Bakshi’s sense of being under pressure deepened. Nehru had also said that he expected reform in the state government, the National Conference, and in Bakshi’s own conduct.

While Bakshi attempted to explain his position, Nehru remained adamant that Bakshi Bashir (Bakshi's son) could not be inducted into the new Cabinet. Nehru's categorical demand for a change in the state government's outlook produced immediate results: the Cabinet was reduced in size; Ghulam Mohammed Rajpuri was dropped; Shyam Lal Saraf was moved to the Lok Sabha; and Bakshi Rashid was excluded. Abdul Gani Trali and Sharma, both ministers of state, were also left out. Asadullah Mir and Dina Nath Mahajan were retained as Cabinet ministers, while Ghulam Nabi Sogami was shifted from Forests and appointed minister of state for Old Industries.

D.P. Dhar was made cabinet minister for New Industries, while Planning was removed from his charge. Sadiq, Dhar, and Syed Mir Qasim were given portfolios with fewer departments. G. L. Dogra was the only exception, retaining finance. Sadiq and his colleagues were chafing, and resentment was rising again. Their predicament worsened as Bakshi began treating the old DNC troika in an offhand manner. He now spoke of a new political approach to deal with those involved in the Kashmir Conspiracy case and with pro-Pakistan activities—without consulting the Sadiq faction, catching everyone off guard.

Subsequently, in private conversations with the Government of India's point man on Kashmir, Bakshi described it as a “grave blunder” to have prosecuted Sheikh Abdullah at Delhi's behest. He questioned Abdullah’s unending trial and proposed a different approach.

Further, he claimed that pro-Pakistan elements in the state—whether Mohiuddin Karra's Political Conference, Mirza Afzal Beg's Plebiscite Front, or even Moulvi Yousuf Shah's party—had practically disintegrated and were seeking rapprochement. His thinking now centred on bringing Afzal Beg back into the fold. As it happened, aligning with this line of thought, the Plebiscite Front soon announced its dissolution, almost on cue after Maulana Sayeed (PF leader) returned from Delhi, where he had met Mridula Sarabhai, a vocal supporter of freeing Sheikh Abdullah.

With Bakshi introducing a new dynamic into the calculus, the Kashmir point man met Indira Gandhi at the Prime Minister’s residence on 1 June 1962 to brief her on the developments. It was even suggested that Bakshi could be brought to the Centre to enable new leadership in Kashmir. Gandhi remarked that she had her own views on the matter, but no one was prepared to accept them.

Bakshi’s Growing Paranoia

All these events must be seen through the lens of an insecure incumbent, Bakshi, who pushed for the withdrawal of cases against those accused in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case, including Mirza Afzal Beg, who was Sheikh Abdullah’s key lieutenant. The Government of India later chose to withhold action. On 9 August 1958, Beg had formed the Plebiscite Front, demanding a plebiscite on the state’s accession and Abdullah’s unconditional release. The resulting tension was evident as hostility became the driving force.

Rumours persisted for nearly two years that Bakshi was trying to reach out to Beg and others for a realignment of forces. Over a year earlier, Beg had been abruptly transferred to Balakot (camp jail) near Pahalgam on grounds of his daughter’s marriage—despite the fact that he had no daughter.

Some of the accused, including Abdullah's other acolytes, Mohammed Amin, Ahmadullah Hamdani, Mirza Afzal Beg, and Ghulam Mohd. Chikan, were released on parole for various periods. They met Bakshi and his brother, Bakshi Abdur Rashid, on multiple occasions under different pretexts. Bakshi’s reconsideration had begun as early as 1957, when Delhi pressed him to release Sheikh Abdullah. Resentment, evidently, was not irrevocable. Bakshi's shifting position was driven by various factors:

• Bakshi feared that Sheikh Abdullah might reach an understanding either with Sadiq and his group, who had resigned from the government and the party, or with the Government of India.
• Second, after August 1955, Bakshi consistently expressed that Delhi had a soft corner for Sheikh Abdullah and might strike a bargain with him.
• Bakshi was aware that Delhi knew of his maladministration and personal corruption and was holding back only out of political expediency until an alternative was found.

Against this backdrop, in December 1957, when the Kashmir point man met him, he reported Bakshi’s state of mind to the prime minister in a classified memo: “Last week I happened to be in Jammu and had a few occasions to see Bakshi Sahib. During the course of our conversations, I had glimpses of the working of his mind which appeared to me a painful departure from his past and hence very disturbing. It is possible that I have either failed to understand the proper import of his expressions or even I might be tending to exaggerate my doubts, but I feel that notice may be taken of my lurking fears of Bakshi Sahib’s weakened will. Frankly speaking, I returned very confused after my recent visit to Jammu. I find it very difficult to sum up my impressions. It is possible that all that he said was with a view to bargain further for Sheikh’s continued detention. All the same I cannot completely shed the fear that something sinister may be developing behind the back of the Government of India. (19.12.1957).”

Beg was released and allowed to attend the Constituent Assembly session. When he did not respond to Bakshi’s overtures, he was jailed again. After Sheikh’s release on 8 January 1958 and his failure to use the opportunity given to him, Bakshi created situations to provoke him into trouble.

When Sheikh had finally quietened down, Bakshi manoeuvred his way and forced the Government of India to agree to his re-arrest. With no compromise reached with Beg, Bakshi began wooing the Muslim Conference sections led by Moulvi Atiqullah. He pampered them and took every step to show himself as the greatest benefactor of Muslims after Zain-ul-Din (Badshah).

In this incendiary mix, the Democratic National Conference proved irksome for him. He failed to crush them and repeatedly accused Delhi of giving them patronage. With 20 members in the Assembly, they formed a sizable opposition. To keep them at bay, he devised several stratagems:

• When the DNC threatened to expose Bakshi and his actions, he tried to communalise the situation in the services, law and order, and related areas.
• When the DNC insisted on steps for further integration, Bakshi attempted to defend himself by invoking ‘Special Status’. Ten full columns were published in the Hindustan Times as an advertisement, allegedly paid for clandestinely through Durga Das (then Editor of the newspaper).

While he had failed to deal with Beg and others, Delhi admonished him to accommodate the DNC group. In December 1959, Bakshi reluctantly agreed to take back Sadiq and his group. His attempt to silence them by offering Cabinet posts failed. They instead gained positions of vantage from which to espouse their views. Both Sadiq and Qasim became popular with the local Islamic clergy. Sadiq briefly wavered, but Qasim questioned his judgement and brought him back in line.

Further steps towards integration took place: ratification of accession through the Constitution; extension of fundamental rights; extension of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and appointment of judges; administrative and financial integration; bringing the Auditor-General of India’s control into effect; and supervision by the Election Commissioner.

As Bakshi sensed Delhi encroaching on his turf, he opened parleys with Beg’s followers. He feared that his personal fortune and that of his brothers, amounting to a few crores, would eventually be scrutinised.

In the 1962 elections, Bakshi and Rashid adopted a strategy to have former DNC members unseated. He failed, and Cabinet formation was carried out under Delhi’s duress, with all four DNC members included.

His attempts at realignment with Beg and others received no response. Citing Delhi’s insistence on adopting of a ‘political approach’ to Sheikh Abdullah, he took everyone by surprise by introducing a Cabinet resolution to this effect. Sadiq was not consulted and did not attend that Cabinet meeting. Qasim and D.P. Dhar sought clarification. Bakshi left for Delhi. Meanwhile, Sadiq telephoned the Home and Defence Ministers from Jammu, cautioning them against any action.

Regarding his meeting with the defence minister in Srinagar, he told the point man thus: “I told Krishna Menon that I am neither foolish like Sheikh Abdullah nor a puppet like Khurshid Hasan Khurshid President of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. I know my people and am aware where I stand with them.”

During the Prime Minister’s stay in Srinagar, the Kashmir point man again made several attempts to prod him. On Sunday, 20 May 1962, at Dachigam, he met him with Zutshi and Sat Lal. When Bakshi became expansive that evening and began condemning Sadiq and his group and their personal vilification campaign against him in Delhi, the point man found an opportunity to state the following:

1. “I, for one, have stood by you both on grounds of unanimity of thinking on political issues concerning Kashmir and also as a personal friend.
2. Whatever your political aim has been, they were carried out by some of us against great odds.

There have been most delicate political assignments given by you which were carried out to your entire satisfaction. As far as I am aware, Delhi has not betrayed you. They continue to look at you as their mouthpiece. But I have a painful duty to tell you and that is, you appear to me to be a changed man. Can you say with all sincerity that you have been sharing all your thoughts with me? To me, the position appears to be in reverse order than what it was in 1955. You used to come up with all your problems to Delhi, but now it seems that your ways have been inscrutable. I do not know what your personal predilections are, but as a friend I have every right to-know if you think in terms of Pakistan. I may not agree with you, if you think on these lines, but as a friend I might be able to advise you what suits you best. You are aware that there are all sorts of rumours in the Valley about Beg etc. and you seem to encourage this policy of drift. I can tell you that this attitude will help neither you nor Delhi. At least I want to know what were the basis and understanding you had arrived at with Beg etc.”

It was midnight, and Bakshi maintained a discreet silence. When pressed that he had not stated his mind, he said that he would meet again the next day. He avoided any further meeting. Until the 19^th, several attempts were made each day to draw him out, but he ensured no discussion took place. On the night of the 28^th, when he was finally alone and returned to the same subject, he parried again and said the point man should come back by 2 June, when he would speak further on the matter.

In his note to the Prime Minister, the point man made many observations:

“What I have heard from various sources in the Valley, I doubt he would make any frank statement. His thinking appears distorted, and he seems to be seeking an approach that may not align with India’s interests.

1. As a first step, he may have wanted Beg and others to provoke Sadiq and the rest to leave the Government.
2. With Beg beside him, he could then pressure Delhi to safeguard special status and prevent interference in internal matters.
3. This situation would give Bakshi greater bargaining power vis-à-vis Delhi, and no attempt would be made to probe maladministration.
4. As the wags in Kashmir say—and their guesses are often not unfounded—Beg’s return may be a prelude to bargaining with Pakistan.

In this direction, Bakshi is said to have told Moulvi Atiqullah, who died recently, that he did not want Muslims to be destroyed by the Indian Army, as Sheikh Abdullah’s actions would have led to. In 1947, before the invasion, Bakshi had expressed support for Pakistan, while it was Sheikh Abdullah who invited India. He is reported to have stated, ‘I am building Kashmir with the resources of Indians and will take it as a strong unit of Pakistan.’ Besides several other factors pointing in this direction, I was told by Mir Qasim—a Minister in the present Cabinet and an ex-DNC member—that at a social gathering in the house of Air Marshal Asghar in Lahore, a relative of his, Capt. Ghulam Mohammed, was present when Kashmir came up in conversation. Asghar is said to have remarked that Bakshi has a long-range view and should not be misunderstood. Air Marshal Asghar is the son of Brig. Rahimtollah, who served in the "Azad Kashmir" Army. Capt. Ghulam Mohammed is their relative who remained in Kashmir and has visited Pakistan only once. I have tried to present the side of the picture which I saw. The Government of India may possess other facts that contradict my views, but what I gathered from my conversations with many responsible people confirms my concerns. These include Justice Nair of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court and R.C. Raina, I.A.S., former Private Secretary to Sheikh Sahib and, after dismissal, to Bakshi Sahib.”

With deception afoot and Bakshi's fealty to India under question, linear and non-linear narratives began to blur in Kashmir. On Saturday, 23 June, the Home Minister called the point man to his residence at 9 in the evening, where he explained the developments in Jammu and Kashmir during and after the Prime Minister’s stay in Srinagar. Brief notes and talking points that had been prepared were reviewed. During the conversation, reference was made to I.G.P. Mehra, his personal conduct, and his complete identification with Bakshi. This was in connection with Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah’s interview with Boota Singh, the Warden of the jail.

Delhi-Bakshi Rift Deepens

At around this time, Defence Minister Krishna Menon's relations with Bakshi were not cordial. It was also mentioned that before the Defence Minister went to Srinagar on the eve of the Prime Minister’s visit, he met the Home Minister, Lal Bahadhur Shastri, and told him he intended to speak plainly to Bakshi, which he did. Shastriji then took a detailed debrief from the point man.

“The Home Minister also asked him about Mir Qasim. I said that, in his present frame of mind, he appears sound and has a scientific approach to issues. The Home Minister showed keen interest in the discussion, which lasted fifty minutes. He expressed his desire to retain copies of the following papers:

1. Talking points given to Mrs Indira Gandhi.
2. Review of events during and after the Prime Minister Nehru's stay in Srinagar.
3. List of names of certain people from outside Kashmir who, on recommendations, received permits for bus routes for themselves or their nominees.
4. List of names of people in the State who have been issued route permits.
5. Extracts from Vincent Sheean’s book Nehru – Ten Years of Power relating to his comments on Bakshi and Abdullah. He said he would return these papers after further perusal and added that he would give the point man more time to meet him after 26th June.”

During the Prime Minister’s stay in Srinagar (16-20 May 1962), Bakshi was reluctant to meet him for any serious discussion. When invited for lunch, he avoided it and instead sought another lunch engagement with the Prime Minister, this time with his family. Sadiq and D.P. Dhar kept their lunch engagements with the Prime Minister. Bakshi did not like this and asked the Prime Minister’s personal assistant to invite all his Cabinet colleagues for lunch. The Prime Minister called them all for tea and discussed matters such as town planning, damage to Shankaracharya Hill, and the importance of Srinagar as a tourist destination—subjects Bakshi did not appreciate.

While the Prime Minister was in Srinagar, the town was rife with rumours, and Bakshi was approached to secure an official contradiction. The State Government issued a characteristic press note, which added: “Rumours are entirely fabricated and mischievous. Most of the rumour-mongers belong to the groups which have been persistently trying to create confusion and disturb peace and tranquility of the State. Suitable action under the law is being taken in the matter.”

The press note, which did not mention the rumours it sought to counter, only confused public opinion further. Bakshi is said to have forwarded to the Prime Minister the text of an interview Sheikh Abdullah had with the jail warden, which appeared condemnatory of the Government of India and of Pandit Nehru in particular. The point man, however, received a different version of this interview from Mohammed Amin, one of the prisoners in the Conspiracy Case who is now on parole.

“Sheikh Abdullah is said to have requested the warden of the jail Boota Singh to come to him to receive a message for the Government. This contained two points. One concerned his colleagues, who according to him, had suffered on his account. As he was the only person responsible, all punishment that may be prescribed should be visited on him. Seeking to draw attention to the sufferings undergone by these men, and their ill-health he pleaded that cases against them may be withdrawn and they rehabilitated adequately. The second point was that he is the arbiter of his own actions and he did not mind what happened to him. But he would want to live if permitted with his family, wife and children, in a house that may be guarded. The type of house confinement he wanted was like what General Neguib (Egyptian military officer and revolutionary who along with Gamal Abdel Nasser was responsible for the Free Officers Movement in 1952 which toppled the monarchy, but he fell out with Nasser and was imprisoned) was condemned to.”

The point man returned to Srinagar on 2 June 1962. Although he met Bakshi several times, Bakshi avoided any subtantive discussion. It was only on the morning of the 8^th, when he had invited Biju Patnaik, Chief Minister of Orissa, for lunch at Dachigam, that the point man found him discussing the possible release of Beg and others and his talks on the matter with Defence Minister Krishna Menon. Although he asked the point man to join the conversation, the point man found him pensive and stayed away. What transpired between the two remained unknown in Srinagar. Shri Patnaik also did not reveal anything to D.P. Dhar, who met him twice to learn his views.

On Sunday, the 10th, Bakshi took Patnaik to Pahalgam and returned on the afternoon of the 11^th. He invited the point man to join him, but he declined. Shri Patnaik left Srinagar for Delhi on the 12th. On the same day, Bakshi intervened in the Budget debate and made a significant statement, reported in the Indian Express of 13 June 1962:

“Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Kashmir Premier, described here today the Plebiscite Front as a ‘communal and anti-India party’. The Premier was intervening in the budget debate in the Legislative Assembly to reply to a purely political issue injected into the debate by the Praja Parishad General Secretary, Rishi Kumar Kaushal had suggested that conditions should be created for ‘Sheikh Abdullah to lead the National Conference Party’. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad said that by its advocacy of communalism and anti-India feelings in some quarters the Praja Parishad had confirmed that it had ‘ganged up’ with the equally communal pro-Abdullah Plebiscite Front.”

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, however, paid tribute to Sheikh Abdullah for “shaping the destinies of the people of Jammu and Kashmir” and for his role “as a freedom fighter”. In both these fields, he said, Sheikh Abdullah’s contributions were substantial, and in 1953, when Abdullah was dismissed, the National Conference, in parting company with him, had only upheld his principles, ideals, and programme.

“But this parting has always pained us,” he added.

“The National Conference,” he said, “has always withstood communal frenzy and identified itself with the forces of democracy and freedom. It is surprising that today, nine years after Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal, the Praja Parishad should choose to champion his cause. All these years, the Praja Parishad had resisted accusations of collusion with communal forces in the state.”

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad urged Kaushal to “keep your politics and your methods clean like your leader” (Prem Nath Dogra). In an earlier address to the Assembly, he had placed similar emphasis on eradicating corruption and had dramatically suggested that P.N. Dogra serve as Chairman as a member of the Committee to be constituted for this purpose.

Some of his important colleagues, including Sadiq, Mir Qasim, and D.P. Dhar, saw his remarks only as a tactical retreat from his recent position.

Both Mir Qasim and Sadiq, who met the point man separately, asked him to convey the following to the concerned quarters:

1. In view of Sheikh Abdullah’s betrayal in 1953, we must avoid giving Bakshi any similar opportunity.
2. He should not be driven to the wall, as he is more clever and wily than Sheikh Abdullah.
3. Under these circumstances, greater vigilance by Central Government organisations in the State is essential.
4. His latest move should be taken at face value only, not as a genuine change of heart.
5. They cited several cases of corrupt practices, particularly the granting of bus route permits to various individuals, and disclosed some names.

On the night of the 12^th, when the point man met Bakshi by appointment, they discussed some pending cases relating to the Information and Broadcasting Ministry. Once that was done, he voluntarily said that he had a few more things to add in continuation of the conversation at Dachigam. It was clear that Bakshi’s mind was fertile with conspiracy theories. He said:

“Merger of D.N.C. has failed…They are conspiring against me…Qasim is the cleverest of the lot, but Sadiq is the mastermind of this conspiracy. D.P. is not taken in to much confidence, but they make him play their game…They say that they have patronage of Delhi…They are planning for Qasim to be Prime Minister since Sadiq is ill and cannot shoulder the burden. I know how they are convincing members of the Assembly and officers about their future plans. Let them do it. They want that I should go to Delhi as Deputy Minister. I will deal with them…By the beginning of July, I have to take Kushak Bakula as a Minister and shall take that opportunity of expanding the Cabinet. I shall drop some of them or they might go themselves, and they can take a few Assembly Members along with them…Let me see how many they can take along with them. I don’t mind if they have a majority with them and form a government, but I know they cannot. Referring to their speeches in the Assembly.”

He referred to speeches of Trilochan Dutt and Gani Mallick in Assembly. “They do not counter criticism of the opposition. They give an impression that it is not their government” I know everything what they tell Delhi…Panditji keeps me completely informed…Realising that this was not merely a feint, the point man intervened and suggested that the best course was to confront them with whatever doubts he had and settle the matter once and for all.”

He said, that stage has passed. “It is a question of dealing with finality and settling once for all.” The point man again stated that he should call D.P. and ask him to intervene on his behalf. His reply was: “I know D.P. is in receipt of the secret funds to work against me…all the rumours have been floated by them. They want to create instability in the public mind about me and the National Conference.”

It was now evident that Bakshi was hard-charging and trying to force his way through. He was again advised not to leave matters adrift and to take them up directly with Delhi. He said: “I am going there in the first week of July and shall let them know the steps I am going to take.”

The point man then noted: On the 13th, at 11 a.m., Sadiq called on him. Although he did not disclose what Bakshi had said the previous night, he indicated that provocations of a nasty nature might be directed at Sadiq and his colleagues, and advised him not to succumb as he had in 1957. Sadiq assured him he would not precipitate any action and would wait for guidance from Delhi. He repeated what Mir Qasim had mentioned earlier: Delhi must remain extraordinarily vigilant about the situation in the state, and a repeat of the 1953 episode must be avoided at all costs.

Utopia

The American journalist and author Vincent Sheean, in his 1960 book, Nehru - The Years of Power, captures this dilemma:

“The two opponents Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohommed have a verbal and terminological disagreement which looks like genuine opposition of ideas. The opposition is genuine alright, but it is not in ideas, but it is in the persons. I do not believe, until proof is forthcoming, that Abdullah ever wanted to unite Kashmir with Pakistan (whenever I talked to him in past years he was not only dead set against the two nation theory, but also regarded it as contrary to the simplest material interests of Kashmir. Obviously the troubled and unhappy country of Pakistan cannot help Kashmir much; it can scarcely govern itself. No, Abdullah's dream has been of another order - a sort of enchanted Valley indeed with no connection to the outer world except to receive its generous dollar laden visitors. And I do not see Ghulam Muhammad's feeling, although it is far more hard headed than Abdullah's, is and much different. Allegiance to India, yes; but was ever anybody more determined upon allegiance to India than Abdullah a few years ago? Can anybody be positive in asserting that Ghulam Muhammad will never change his mind altogether or in part? He will, I hope, forgive me for saying that although his assertions today seem to be as sincere as they are necessary, and I could not possibly doubt it, the political carousel is constantly throwing everybody into different positions. Politics is indeed the region of successive sincerities and they are not always the same.”

Sheean could well have been clairvoyant.

Back-channel dialogue seeking resolution began in earnest. Erstwhile DNC member D.P. Dhar arrived in Delhi at 11 p.m on 29 June1962 and met the Kashmir point man at 1.30 p.m. the same day. Recounting the situation after the point man left Srinagar on 13 June, Dhar said that Sadiq had sensed Bakshi’s intentions to precipitate a crisis in his relations with Delhi and with the ex-DNC group. He felt Sadiq should speak frankly and strongly to Bakshi about the way he was slipping into a situation similar to the one created by Sheikh Abdullah in 1952-53.

Dhar and Qasim both advised Sadiq to be patient and to meet Bakshi personally to draw him out. Sadiq tried twice, but Bakshi refused to divulge his mind and said that the Working Committee would be the best forum to discuss the situation. Before the Working Committee and General Council met, however, Bakshi convened a Cabinet meeting attended by Sogami, Bhagat Chhajju Ram, and the Chief Secretary. He opened the discussion by referring to a statement made by Prof. Balraj Madhok, Zonal Secretary of Jan Sangh, and said he saw no difference between that statement and the one Home Minister Shastri had made in Parliament.

Sadiq intervened at this stage, saying that Bakshi Sahib’s approach was erroneous and would lead them to disastrous consequences, as happened in 1953. He referred to Sheikh Abdullah’s stand in 1952-53 and said Abdullah had slipped in a similar way when he claimed to see no difference between the positions of S.P. Mookerji and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Sadiq grew animated and stressed that they should think calmly and consider whether any form of abrogation of Article 370 actually affected the position of Kashmiris.

He said that Article 370 offered only illusory notions of autonomy, and if those in Delhi felt the time had come to end it, they should not begrudge it. He added that he personally believed it gave no particular advantage except for creating a psychological barrier between Kashmir and the rest of India.

Bakshi remonstrated at this stage and said that this position had been guaranteed by the Constitution and Delhi should know it. Sadiq then asked why it was being made an issue. Had Delhi, at any stage in the recent past, indicated to Bakshi or anyone else that the present arrangement should be altered? Bakshi then referred to Shastriji’s statement. Sadiq replied that the Home Minister had spoken in response to a Parliamentary question, and no Member of Parliament could be prevented from raising one.

Mir Qasim entered the discussion and urged them to examine Article 370 closely. Except for the right of permanent citizenship—mainly property rights—he said, it offered little real benefit. He argued that bringing the State on a par with the rest of the country, particularly in labour laws, would work to the advantage the general population. He concluded that if they felt this was not the appropriate time for any change, they could simply tell Delhi so without generating heat or controversy. Sadiq added that he personally preferred the same administration and organisational pattern as the rest of the country, but if his colleagues unanimously felt the time was not ripe, he would abide by their view.

Bakshi then calmed and suggested another meeting at which they could discuss the draft resolution of the Working Committee. D.P. Dhar told the point man that another Cabinet meeting was scheduled before the Working Committee met. He was asked to read the draft resolution, which made no reference to Article 370. This was followed by a meeting of the General Council, where only Bakshi spoke. He referred to Article 370 and to rumours about a rift within the Cabinet.

D.P. Dhar further disclosed that Bakshi repeated the performance of Sheikh Abdullah (1952-53) by letting in only the correspondents of the local press to the exclusion of correspondents representing outside J & K newspapers. He made a vehement speech in defending Article 370, meant for local consumption. The other correspondents were briefed separately and given a milder version of his speech. From the point man’s trunk-call conversation with the AIR correspondent, he gathered that, besides publicising the Working Committee resolution, Bakshi was particularly keen to have his reference to Article 370 highlighted in the All India Radio broadcasts. This was accordingly done in the main English bulletins at 9 p.m. on the night of 29^th and at 8 a.m. on the 30^th.

While discussing these developments, D.P. Dhar also revealed that Sadiq had at one point been insistent that, since he did not expect to live long, he did not want to be remembered as someone who connived in Bakshi’s misrule. He wanted to confront Bakshi about his stratagem concerning the release of Beg and others. D.P. Dhar said that both Qasim and he persuaded him not to do so.

D.P. Dhar also referred to Rashid’s meeting with him, during which Rashid argued that releasing Sheikh Abdullah would have been a mistake and that he had not been consulted. I mentioned to D.P. Dhar about Rashid’s similar conversation with the point man in Delhi. Both felt that Rashid had grown apprehensive about Bakshi’s future and was choosing sides in good time.

Qasim had also mentioned to D.P. Dhar what he had earlier related to the point man concerning Bakshi’s likely contacts with Pakistan.

Conclusion

From the point man’s notes: “Since my return from Srinagar, I had kept the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, and Shastriji informed about the situation there. My assessment was broadly in the same line with D.P. Dhar’s, and it was agreed that he would follow it up with all of them. He had already sought interviews with the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Defence Minister, and Mrs Gandhi, and was scheduled to meet the Prime Minister on 30 June at 4 p.m.

In view of these meetings, it was agreed that I need not send any notes either to the Prime Minister or the Home Minister. As I was likely to meet the Home Minister that night, I could mention this to him in person.”

On Sunday, 1 July, at 9.30 p.m., the point man met the Home Minister again, as requested, and conveyed to him the impressions given by D.P. Dhar in accordance with the recorded points. He also briefed him on the state of affairs in the recent by-election at Amira Kadal.

Shastriji expressed amazement at the statement of Bakshi equating him with Balraj Madhok. The point man also mentioned Bakshi’s letter to the Prime Minister about direct elections to Parliament. He wanted the point man to obtain a reference, as Prime Minister has not passed on that letter to him. The point man summarised D.P. Dhar’s impressions of his talks with the Prime Minister. Shastriji said that, on his return, the point man should meet him and keep him informed about the developments during the PM’s visit there.

D.P. Dhar also met the Defence Minister and Indira Gandhi. The reports he shared with the point man looked encouraging in the manner that awareness about the latest situation in Kashmir was growing in these exalted circles. The question of tackling the problem would be taken up after Prime Minister’s return from Srinagar.

Bakshi then played the Pakistan card, a bogey which always worked during those tumultuous times. In the smoke-and-mirrors politics of Kashmir, his dangerous move came in the form of a J & K National Conference Working Committee resolution charging the US and Britain with openly aligning themselves with what it called a policy of naked aggression and subversion of peace and security by Pakistan in the UN Security Council debate on Kashmir. The resolution released in Srinagar on 29 June 1962 was a bombshell.

Sensing that the Centre might abrogate Article 370, Bakshi argued that from the beginning the Security Council had ignored Pakistan’s aggression and forcible occupation of large areas of the state. He said this was established beyond doubt by Pakistan’s own submissions and the findings of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan. The Council, he claimed, had equated Pakistan, the aggressor, with India, the victim.

Referring to attempts to revive the resolutions of UNCIP passed in 1948 and 1949, it stated that developments of far-reaching character have taken place in the long intervening period. These included the convening of the Constituent Assembly based on adult franchise. This assembly had declared the people’s will emphatically in favour of Kashmir’s accession to India.

While Jammu and Kashmir had successfully rolled out two Five-Year Plans and begun a third, Pakistan had joined military alliances and closed most democratic institutions. The masses in Pakistan were being repressed by martial law, and in accordance with the opportunistic policies, it had opened negotiations with China to barter away part of J&K territory under its illegal occupation.

The resolution added that, in view of these factors, it was futile for the Western powers to harp on old and obsolete resolutions to appease the aggressors. The Working Committee resolution also conveyed its gratitude to the Soviet Union and other friendly powers for their stand on the subject.

Explaining his stand, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed said that NC considered the Constituent Assembly’s ratification of accession, the abolition of hereditary monarchy, land reforms, and the state’s special constitutional status—granted due to specific circumstances—as not ripe for any form of abrogation, as nothing had changed since their onset. Reiterating that J&K was an integral and inalienable part of India, Bakshi had neutered Pakistan, Delhi, and the UN with one swift strike. He added that the Jan Sangh wanted the abrogation of Article 370 in order to deprive people of the fruits of freedom.

Once again, an astute but besieged Bakshi had quelled the many challenges that he was facing. But it was temporary peace, for the near future was to bring a maelstrom of epic proportions. 

• About the author: Sandeep Bamzai is author of the trilogy, Bonfire of Kashmiriyat, Princestan, and Gilded Cage (Rupa & Co). 
• Source: All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.