The Houthi Model – Non-State Actors and Multi-Drone Capabilities
Abstract: Terrorist use of drones has expanded significantly in the 21st century as a result of the widespread proliferation of drone technology. Yemen’s Houthi movement – a non-state group conducting drone strikes with unique frequency in the last decade – uses technologically sophisticated and logistically complex multi-drone attacks as a central piece of their military and propaganda strategies. Examining the practical and symbolic dimensions of the Houthis’ drone air force provides greater insight into the trajectory of future multi-drone attacks as well as their role in Houthi efforts to portray themselves as Yemen’s legitimate government. Groups that integrate advanced drone technologies (especially from state-sponsors) into their military capabilities and state-building rhetoric are following the “Houthi Model.”
Introduction
Since the outbreak of war in Gaza, regional conflict in Yemen has escalated into an international crisis. In November of 2023, the Iran-backed Houthi movement began targeting merchant and naval vessels transiting major trade routes in the Red Sea to apply economic pressure against Israel and its allies’ actions in the Gaza Strip. By exerting control over global supply chains reliant on the shipping chokepoint of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, the Houthis hope to elevate their regional importance and reinforce their sovereignty. A cornerstone of the Houthi strategy is their “uncrewed aerial vehicle air force,” an arsenal of technologically sophisticated drones imported directly from Iran or assembled from a combination of foreign and domestically manufactured components. Drone strikes – especially the advanced type utilizing multiple drones simultaneously – support the Houthis’ narrative of fighting for independence and national sovereignty against an oppressive coalition of external powers. Branding themselves as technologically sophisticated freedom fighters of the true Yemeni state rejects outside designations (and redesignations) of the Houthis as a terrorist or insurgent group. Drone attacks are central to both the military and propaganda strategy of the Houthis; examining the dimensions of their drone operations, both practical and symbolic, in the context of the “Houthi Model” of state-building, gives greater clarity to the trajectory of multi-drone terrorism in the future for similar groups.
Background
Terrorist use of drones has expanded significantly in the 21st century in large part due to greater availability of the technology; groups like ISIS, Hamas, and other non-state militias have exploited the ubiquity of drones, adapting cheap civilian drone systems to conduct surveillance or carry improvised explosives. State-supported groups began operating drones en masse in the last decade, conducting simultaneous multi-drone attacks requiring greater technological sophistication and logistical capability. Studies identify several appeals that multi-drone terrorism might have for non-state groups: its potential to facilitate mass casualty attacks, reduce risk to human assets, avoid countermeasures, and increase group publicity. These motivations push lesser states, non-state actors, and knowledgeable individuals to adopt emerging drone technologies. Yemen’s Houthis have a distinct ideological motivation behind their extensive use of drones: a desire to portray themselves as a modern, technologically advanced state rather than a conventional terrorist organization. The Houthis are unique among non-state groups in their en masse use of drone strikes since 2015.
The Houthis contest the philosophical idea of the modern death of the state, suggesting that non-state groups continue to aspire towards achieving international recognition as independent government authorities.
The Houthi movement, or Ansar Allah, has been in conflict with the internationally recognized Yemeni government for nearly two decades. The Houthis seized control of Yemen’s capital in 2015, expelling the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. Since then, the Houthis have exerted control over the north-west of Yemen, reshaping prior institutions with their extremist sectarian Zaydi Shiite ideology. Statehood in the postcolonial Middle East is notoriously complicated. It is especially difficult to ascribe western theories of state formation to Yemen, a region that rejected Eurocentric models of governance even before its civil war and ongoing insurgency. Historian Charles Tilly’s famous maxim “war made states and states made war” is both proven and disproven by Houthi governance and hybrid Yemeni sovereignty.
The Houthis contest the philosophical idea of the modern death of the state, suggesting that non-state groups continue to aspire towards achieving international recognition as independent government authorities. Houthis have conducted increasingly sophisticated drone attacks in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, most significantly two multi-drone strikes in 2019, first on Saudi oil tankers and later on Aramco’s Shaybah oil field with ten drones in a swarm-like attack. These attacks stand out for their large scale and relative sophistication: non-state groups traditionally lack the funding, armament, or technological capability to conduct drone attacks with multiple drones at once. The Houthis, however, are outfitted with advanced fixed-wing drones able to carry larger ordinances and attack in synchronized groups. These military drone operations fit into traditionally the most difficult aspect of sovereignty for non-state actors to achieve and sustain: significant impact on the foreign policy of established “superpower” nations.
The Houthi Model
Strategic strikes using a modern arsenal of drone platforms requires foreign policy engagement whereas the traditional violence of terrorism might prohibit negotiation: back-channel attempts to coordinate a ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have failed multiple times and diplomats from the United Nations and Oman have occasionally met with Houthi and Saudi leaders to mediate negotiations towards peace. Yahya Sarea, spokesperson for the Houthi Armed Forces, and other Houthi military leaders describe targeting an American destroyer in the Red Sea using several drones. In response, the United States took military and diplomatic action to facilitate humanitarian aid to Yemen and Gaza and defend maritime trade. According to the Department of War, the US military has spent upwards of $1 billion dollars in efforts to protect vessels in the Red Sea; the “Shahed” model drones used by the Houthis cost about $35,000 per drone. One report describes the Houthis’ siege as the biggest disruption to international trade since the COVID-19 pandemic, reducing shipments through the Red Sea by 70 percent. While the United States employs the “stick”, China uses the “carrot” by offering weapons manufacturing equipment and shell-company funding in exchange for the safe passage of Chinese-flagged vessels.
A Houthi drone as observed by a French destroyer in the Red Sea shortly before interception
Houthi leaders claim to have designed and manufactured their drone air force internally despite the fact that their drone platforms – such as the Qasef-I – are nearly identical in design and construction to Iranian drones like the Ababil-II, often sharing serial numbers identical to those produced in Iran. The state-sponsored drone armament of Ansar Allah and their ability to produce “hybrid” drones from imported and domestic parts typifies the vanguard threat of multi-drone attacks by non-state actors. However, Iranian backing alone does not distinguish the Houthis’ use of drones from other non-state groups. Iran has a history of providing technology to terrorist networks as part of its proxy conflicts across the Middle East. Hezbollah has been using Iranian-provided drones against Israel since the early 2000s. Iran gave drones to the Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba militia in Iraq and Hamas in Gaza. The Houthis are unique in that they use drones as both a strategic military capability and a propaganda tool to build credibility.
The Houthis have set military drone operations at the center of their propaganda strategy. During a 2022 military parade, Houthi military vehicles displaying their drone air force on truck beds passed by formations of uniformed soldiers. In videos circulated by Houthi social media accounts, Sarea delivers a press conference applauding the alleged success of eight years of drone operations before the video cuts to a computer-generated drone image that rotates alongside attack statistics. Sarea’s X/Twitter account had over 500,000 followers before being banned last year and his English-language account had posted hundreds of tweets mentioning drones and reporting attacks conducted by the Houthi drone air force. Houthi followers regularly share similar propaganda videos and messages crowded with drone content on Twitter or Telegram groups. The Almasirah Media Network – Yemen’s Houthi-run propaganda channel – consistently reports on the Houthi’s possession and use of drones. Selectively citing Western military reporting, the Almasirah Network broadcasts that the Houthi drone strategy has “challenged traditional, high-cost defense systems and highlighted the effectiveness of relatively inexpensive asymmetric warfare technologies.” They are indeed correct that sophisticated multi-drone drone threats from non-state actors like the Houthis have influenced operational calculus for Western powers in the Red Sea: US Central Command recently announced Task Force Scorpion Strike, the US military’s first squadron of low cost, one-way-attack drones based in the Middle East, a pivot to the very technology threatening US forces in the region.
Conclusion
Dozens of states have adopted drone systems into their militaries during the 21st century, from democratic nations to autocratic leaders, from full-fledged regional conflicts in Europe to piracy in the Red Sea. With modern warfighting mired in proxy conflict and gray-zone operations, it is not surprising that regimes like Iran have provided non-state groups with financial and material support to acquire similar weapons systems. Arming the Houthis enables Tehran to strengthen its regional influence, build prestige around its military technology, and undermine its rivals. The future threat of multi-done terrorism by non-state actors is made salient by increasingly sophisticated Houthi multi-drone attacks. The Houthis hold drones on a rhetorical pedestal, wielding multi-drone attacks as a tool to build their own regional legitimacy. Groups that adopt advanced drone technologies into their military capabilities and political rhetoric to portray themselves as legitimate governments are following the “Houthi Model”; this threat will likely intensify with the emerging use of multi-drone systems in modern warfighting.
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