Power, Law, And The Venezuela Crisis – OpEd

What gets underway in Venezuela is not simply another foreign policy dispute or a response to alleged criminal activity. It clearly indicates a dangerous moment when a powerful state openly tested the limits of international law and institutional restraint. The United States’ military strikes inside Venezuela, followed by the forcible capture of its sitting president and his wife, were carried out without authorisation from the United Nations and in direct defiance of long-standing rules governing sovereignty, the use of force, and head-of-state immunity. The emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council that started on Monday may witness statements and accusations, but eventually US will decide, as always, how long can the Council go! 

For scholars of U.S. power in Latin America, this moment fits into a familiar pattern. Political sociologist James Petras has long argued that U.S. policy in the region has rarely been guided by democratic principle, and almost always by control over resources, markets, and political outcomes. From the Monroe Doctrine onward, Latin America was treated not as a collection of sovereign states, but as a strategic zone where U.S. interests override local choice. Military interventions, economic sanctions, coups, and the installation of compliant regimes were not exceptions, Petras notes, but the normal instruments of dominance  

Venezuela, with the world’s largest confirmed oil reserves and an independent foreign policy orientation, represents a direct challenge to this tradition of control. The present crisis therefore cannot be understood in isolation. It reflects how imperial power operates in practice. Law becomes flexible, institutions become optional, and coercion is seen as necessity. What gets underway is a perilous assertion that rules apply differently when strategic interests, energy security, and geopolitical rivalry fall upon. The consequences of this go beyond Venezuela, raising urgent questions about the future of international law in an increasingly unequal world order.

Law, Power, and U.S. Practice

International law places strict limits on the use of force and on the treatment of sitting heads of state. Customary international law, affirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case, recognises personal immunity for serving heads of state. This rule exists to protect sovereign equality and prevent disorder in international relations. It requires that accountability follow agreed legal pathways -  international tribunals, Security Council authorisation, or prosecution after a leader leaves office.

In the Venezuela case, none of these conditions were met. There was no mandate from the UN Security Council. There was no active proceeding before an international criminal tribunal. Maduro remained the head of state at the time of the operation. On these grounds, many international lawyers argue that the action falls outside accepted legal norms. Tal Amodai has described this as a rupture in the enforcement logic of international law, where power substitutes for institutional process.

U.S. domestic law offers a different picture. Supreme Court rulings such as Ker v. Illinois and Frisbie v. Collins allow prosecution once a defendant is physically before a U.S. court, regardless of how they were brought there. This doctrine reflects a narrow view of due process focused on trial procedure, not on international legality. It explains how U.S. courts may proceed, but it does not convert international illegality into lawful action.

Scholars like Christopher Totten note that U.S. courts traditionally defer to executive guidance on head-of-state immunity, even when that guidance conflicts with customary international law. This deference creates a gap between domestic legality and international responsibility. The Venezuela case shows how that gap can be exploited when strategic interests are high and institutional restraint is weak.

Strategy and Justification 

The United States has not framed its Venezuela policy as an isolated action. Its latest National Security Strategy places the Western Hemisphere at the centre of U.S. security concerns. The document stresses migration control, drug trafficking, and the need to counter “hostile external influence,” particularly from China and Russia. Latin America is described less as a community of sovereign partners and more as a strategic space that must remain aligned with U.S. interests.

This approach shows what analysts have called a modernised ‘Monroe Doctrine.’ While the language is updated, the logic is well-known. The hemisphere is treated as a privileged zone where U.S. power has special rights and responsibilities. Venezuela appears in this framework as a test case. Its close ties with China, Russia, and Iran, its resistance to U.S. political pressure, and its control over vast energy reserves combine to make it a strategic outlier.

Under this logic, economic sanctions, naval deployments, and even coercive actions are presented as defensive measures. They are justified as necessary to protect U.S. security and regional stability. The problem is that this reasoning places national strategy above international rules. It assumes that global order can be preserved through unilateral action, even when those actions weaken the very institutions meant to uphold that order.

The concern raised by UN Secretary-General António Guterres during the Security Council session was precisely this precedent. When powerful states act without consent or mandate, they do not merely resolve crises. They change expectations about how states may behave. Over time, this undermines the authority of international law and normalises coercion.

Why Venezuela’s Crisis Cannot Be Simplified

Venezuela’s long economic crisis is often explained in simple terms -  corruption, mismanagement, or ideology. These factors may matter, but they do not tell the whole story. Venezuela’s economy became heavily dependent on oil over decades. When global oil prices collapsed after 2014, state revenues fell sharply. With weak diversification, the shock was severe. Policy errors worsened the situation. Currency controls distorted incentives. Price controls reduced production. Mismanagement at the state oil company lowered output. These problems weakened the economy even before external pressure intensified.

U.S. and allied sanctions then changed the scale of the crisis. Financial sanctions restricted access to credit. Oil sanctions limited exports. Overseas assets were frozen or seized. Even when oil could be produced, payments were blocked or delayed. Imports of spare parts, fuel additives, food, and medicines became difficult. Studies cited by UN rapporteurs and independent economists have linked sanctions to rising mortality and declining living standards.

The crisis also became political. Prolonged confrontation between the government and the opposition paralysed reform. Capital flight accelerated. Skilled workers emigrated. Institutions weakened. Each problem fed the next.

Venezuela’s move toward limited de-dollarisation must be seen in this context. It was essentially a survival strategy. When dollar transactions became risky, the country turned to alternative currencies, barter arrangements, and non-Western partners. For Washington, this was troubling not because Venezuela threatened the dollar directly, but because it showed that sanctioned states might find ways to operate outside U.S. financial control. 

Consequences Beyond Venezuela

The likely consequences of this route extend far beyond Caracas. At the regional level, military pressure and economic isolation enhance renewed instability in Latin America. Refugee flows, political polarisation, and security spillovers affect neighbouring countries. Many governments in the region fear a return to interventionist patterns they had hoped were over.

At the global level, the implications could be much larger. If the arrest of a sitting head of state without international mandate becomes acceptable practice, other powers may follow similar paths. International law depends on restraint, not enforcement by force. When restraint collapses, rules survive only on paper.

There are also geoeconomic effects. Disruptions to Venezuelan oil exports affect energy markets. Asset seizures and sanctions encourage countries to diversify reserves and trade partners. This accelerates the slow breakup of the global financial system. It may reduce U.S. leverage over time, even as it is used more aggressively in the short term.

For the United States itself, the costs may be indirect but real. Military adventurism strains alliances. It fuels scepticism in the Global South. It strengthens the argument that international rules are applied selectively.  

The Venezuela episode is about whether international law can restrain powerful states, or whether it will be determined by them. U.S. domestic law may allow courts to proceed once a defendant is in custody. National security strategy may justify pressure in strategic terms. Neither, on its own, resolves the international legality of the action.