The Horn Of Africa In 2026: Managed Volatility, Contested Sovereignty, And Adaptive Multipolarity – OpEd

The coming year of 2026 appears to maintain the same off-balance state of the region as in previous years. This could only be described as managed volatility i.e. a complex situation of persistent crises, which are being selectively managed and negotiated, thus maintaining the same status quo without leading to complete breakdown of the region or an outright solution of its problems, as represented by fragmentation of the major states of the region (Ethiopia and Somalia, in the main) and state wars (Ethiopia and Eritrea).

The region’s core problems oscillate over resource disputes and geostrategic geography. Sea access and ports, shared waters, trade corridors and maritime routes and chokepoints will remain central to the region’s volatility. This will be complimented by competition over political power within each state, continuing demographic growth and perhaps energy production, which appears to be on the verge of coming to light in the not-too-distant future. Extreme escalation will be tempered as usual by its seemingly opaque but pragmatic diplomacy.

The security dynamics of the region will follow this logic of managed volatility although proxy networks, insurgent groups (ethnic or otherwise) and externally backed terrorism will not disappear during the current year 2026, while humanitarian interventions and pressures will remain a powerful mechanism that will shape the region. Large-scale displacements, acute food insecurity, and now the inability of major donors to fund the growing difficulties, both man-made and natural, in the region, will remain a marker.

The fragility of the region has now a new variable to contend with and that is the recognition of Somaliland, which appears to be becoming a major destabilizing factor. The recognition of Somaliland by a UN member state, albeit a not-readily acceptable one, represents a profound shock to the region’s political order, but there seems to be a widespread belief in the region that the recognition will not ultimately succeed. This skepticism is grounded in historical and structural realities, including African Union norms of territorial integrity, which remains deeply entrenched and especially with states facing their own internal faultlines and there are many in Africa.

The global geopolitics of 2026 appears to be making the Horn of Africa States region a testing ground for the growing and adaptive multipolarity. The militarization of the Red Sea, climate stress and resource pressures appear to be accelerating realignments. There seems to be cooperation and competition among states simultaneously, with the same partners. The year does not look it would bring profound changes to the region and incremental growth is expected to continue.

On the negative side, proxy friction will continue among external actors, insurgencies within the states will also continue and humanitarian situations will deteriorate, sometimes spilling over borders. There seems to be slow erosion of the region, including normalization of the ongoing fragmentation, the hollowing of national institutions and the entrenchment of conflict economies in the region, features which feed and benefit perpetual instability.

On a country by country basis, here is our take as the year progresses:

Ethiopia

During the year 2026, Ethiopia will continue to face the unresolved center-periphery tensions, contested identities and continuing wars in its various regions (the Amhara, Tigray, The Afar and Somali states, Benishangul,  and even Gambela). The country’s posturing to have sea access will not diminish but it may now be drawn more to energy exports and regional influence while avoiding outright confrontations. Whether Ethiopia’s trajectory makes governance reforms to make inclusivity the center or opts for coercive stabilization is to be seen and watched. 

Somalia 

Somalia’s situation will be affected by the recognition of Somaliland by a UN Member state. This will dominate discourse during the year, and the dynamics thereof may consolidate its position as it presents itself as a victim of a foreign invasion. The political minefields of the country will, however, remain a defining feature as 2026 is an election year in the country.

Djibouti

Djibouti’s position as a major logistics hub will remain. It will continue to host military and naval forces of major and middle power states. But 2026 is also an election year in Djibouti but no changes are expected in this regard. Vulnerability to regional shocks (the Red Sea and Bab El Mandab Strait) will remain and perhaps grow and hence the country will be exposed, as usual, to geopolitical rivalry and economic concentration risks.

Eritrea

Eritrea is an opaque country and will continue to be so during the year. The geostrategic location of the country will continue to make it a relevant party thus making it benefit from ambiguity in the place of alignment. Internal reforms are unlikely to happen in 2026 and external pressure will remain insignificant. 

Regional Outlook Summary

The Horn of Africa States region is coming off the old definition of a chaotic region and could probably be said to be grappling, albeit imperfectly, with the realities of an emerging multipolar world. The region’s shared vulnerabilities, economic interdependence, maritime chokepoints and climatic uncertainties may compel cooperation in 2026, leaving behind the old historical and ideological divisions and rivalries.  But the region’s struggles in 2026 are not peripheral to global politics. They must learn to live with a world with many and unknown emerging risks. The region’s future will be shaped less by grand settlements than by cumulative, pragmatic choices made under pressure, fatigue, and interdependence.