Pakistan’s ISKP Gambit: Endangering Beijing’s Afghan Ventures
On January 19, 2026, a suicide bombing at a Chinese-owned restaurant in Kabul’s Shahr-e-Naw district killed multiple civilians, including Chinese nationals. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) claimed responsibility, framing the attack as targeting Chinese presence in Afghanistan. This incident continues a pattern of violence against Chinese interests in the country.
Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Chinese engagement in Afghanistan has proceeded alongside periodic ISKP attacks on Chinese targets. Notable incidents include a 2022 hotel attack in Kabul targeting Chinese nationals and attacks on Chinese workers in subsequent years. While ISKP has claimed responsibility for these attacks, the extent to which they represent a coordinated campaign versus opportunistic violence remains debated among security analysts.
ISKP’s propaganda has increasingly criticized Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang and its economic presence in Muslim-majority countries. The group’s operational capacity appears to benefit from the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, though the nature and extent of any state involvement remains contested. Taliban officials have accused Pakistan of harboring ISKP fighters and enabling cross-border operations. Pakistan denies these allegations and has itself suffered thousands of casualties from militant attacks, including from ISKP and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Turkish intelligence operations have provided some insight into ISKP’s transnational networks. In 2025, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) conducted operations targeting individuals accused of ISKP recruitment and operational planning in the border region. These operations have highlighted the movement of foreign fighters through the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, though attributing this to deliberate state policy versus inadequate border control remains a matter of analytical interpretation.
Pakistan has historically faced accusations of supporting certain militant groups while combating others—a charge Islamabad consistently denies. Critics point to groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which Pakistan banned following international pressure after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, though enforcement of this ban has been questioned by India and international observers. Some analysts have suggested personnel and ideological overlaps between various militant groups in the region, though definitive evidence of systematic organizational transfers remains limited.
Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid has publicly accused Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of relocating ISKP operatives, particularly during periods of heightened border tensions in 2024-2025. Pakistan rejects these accusations and points to its own counterterrorism efforts, including military operations in border regions and the significant toll terrorist violence has taken on Pakistani civilians and security forces. Ehsanullah Ehsan, a former spokesperson for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who escaped from Pakistani custody in 2020, has made unverified allegations about ISI involvement with militant groups. However, his credibility is disputed, and Pakistan denies his claims.
United Nations and U.S. assessments indicate ISKP has exploited regional instability to expand its operational capacity. The group has claimed responsibility for major attacks including the January 2024 Kerman bombings in Iran (killing approximately 94 people), the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow (killing approximately 140 people), and the July 2024 attack at a mosque in Muscat, Oman (killing 6 people). While these attacks demonstrate ISKP’s expanding reach, attributing them to a specific state’s proxy strategy requires evidence beyond the group’s operational capability.
Some analysts argue that Pakistan’s relationship with militant groups serves strategic purposes: deterring Chinese investment in Afghanistan to preserve Pakistani regional influence, and pressuring the Afghan Taliban regarding TTP sanctuaries. This interpretation represents one analytical perspective but is not universally accepted among regional security experts. Chinese investments in Afghanistan, including projects like the Amu Darya oil development and the Mes Aynak copper mine, have proceeded slowly due to multiple factors: security concerns, Taliban governance capacity, international sanctions complications, and commercial viability questions. While ISKP attacks contribute to Chinese caution, attributing investment decisions primarily to Pakistani manipulation oversimplifies a complex landscape.
China has responded to attacks on its nationals through enhanced security protocols, diplomatic engagement with the Taliban, and intelligence cooperation. Beijing has generally avoided publicly attributing responsibility beyond the immediate perpetrators. The broader Pakistan-China relationship, often characterized as an “all-weather friendship” centered on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), adds complexity to this issue. Pakistan has itself experienced attacks on Chinese nationals within its borders, to which it has responded with increased security measures.
The January 2026 Kabul restaurant attack underscores the security challenges facing foreign economic engagement in Afghanistan. While ISKP has demonstrated sustained hostility toward Chinese interests, the question of whether regional states deliberately instrumentalize such groups for strategic purposes remains contested. Pakistan denies involvement in cross-border militancy and emphasizes its own losses to terrorism, while Taliban officials and some analysts maintain that Pakistani support networks enable ISKP operations. Until the international community develops mechanisms to address the underlying sources of militant capacity in the region—whether through state failure or deliberate policy—economic development in Afghanistan will remain constrained by persistent security threats.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position or editorial stance of Khaama Press.
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