Romania Aims To Be the Leading Power of Southeastern Europe. But Who Will Pay for It?
This November, Romanian President Nicușor Dan, elected in a re-run of the presidential elections that were annulled on the basis of Russian malign interference, unveiled Romania’s national security strategy for 2025-2030. For a country known for punching below its weight on the international arena, the document is unusual. It elevates Romania’s regional ambitions to become the biggest power in Southeastern Europe and the most powerful nation east of Germany, after Poland.
In order to transform the status of the leading power of Southeastern Europe from a declared ambition to a reality, the Romanian government needs to start spending like they mean it. First, it needs to upgrade its military budget to adapt to the competitive regional security landscape and meet the 5% of GDP spending for defense that was agreed at the NATO Summit in July 2025. According to NATO data on expenditure as a share of GDP, Romania spent around 2.25% of GDP for defense in 2024. While the country has exceeded the 2% target since 2017, it continues to fall behind other countries on NATO’s eastern flank. In 2024, Poland spent 4.12% of its GDP for defense, Estonia 3.43%, Latvia 3.15%, and Lithuania 2.85%.
Amongst NATO Black Sea allies, Romania is a champion in defense spending, exceeding even Turkey’s 2.09% allotment. However, the recent U.S. decision to withdraw approximately 1000 troops from Romania – mostly from the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base near Constanța – changes the strategic outlook in the Black Sea region. Countries like Romania will need to invest more resources in filling the deterrence vacuum in the face of Russian aggression. Given Romania’s stated ambition to become the host nation of the new EU Maritime Security Hub for the Black Sea, Bucharest should become a model for defense spending in the eastern flank of NATO and move steadily towards meeting the new 5% of GDP for defense target, out of which at least 3.5% has to go towards core military spending and 1.5% towards related enabling factors, like cybersecurity.
Second, Romania should prioritize investment in another core instrument of national power: its diplomacy. The budget of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, relative to GDP, is one of the smallest in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2025, one of the most significant budget cuts was made to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose year-on-year budget declined by almost 19%. The current Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oana Țoiu, stated that the ministry she leads cannot manage its functions with only 0.8% of GDP, given the high stakes it has to meet on the international stage. For a diplomat with 15 years of experience, the Romanian government pays 1,200 EUR/month, which is far less compared to other EU member states, making talent retention a serious challenge.
Instead of stepping up to better equip the Ministry of Foreign Affairs amidst geopolitical turmoil, some members of the Romanian Parliament are doing the opposite, by introducing a bill that would abolish the Romanian Diplomatic Institute, the institution in charge of professionalizing the Romanian diplomatic corp and providing expertise to the different desks in the MFA.
Third, the government in Bucharest must invest in securing its media environment from information warfare, and develop a whole-of-government approach for deterrence against the challenging hybrid operations coming from the Russian Federation. This effort would be in vain without robust institutions mobilized by a skilled workforce. Although Romania was a victim of Russian foreign interference in the 2024 presidential elections, the Romanian government has taken virtually no measures to improve institutional resilience to the cognitive warfare levied by Moscow last year.
Unlike its much smaller neighbor, the Republic of Moldova, Romania has yet to create its own StratCom Center to act as an early-warning mechanism for disinformation narratives. Local
media sources reported that a department for fighting disinformation might be established within
the Romanian Presidency. This new department could be modeled after the American equivalent, i.e. the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC), organized under the coordination of the Director of National Intelligence. This center houses an Election Threats Division, which serves as the intelligence community’s coordination authority for all activities, initiatives, and programs related to election security. Romania should show it has learned from the experience of the 2024 presidential elections and budget more resources to hire additional cybersecurity experts who will harden critical infrastructure involved in democratic processes. Furthermore, Romania should diffuse its lessons learned on countering foreign malign interference to other countries targeted by these Russian information operations. Countries outside the Euro-Atlantic community, like the ones in the Western Balkans and wider Black Sea region, could benefit from Bucharest’s experiences.
Romania’s ambition to become Southeastern Europe’s leading power is not unrealistic: the country has the geostrategic position, NATO membership, and the EU integration needed to claim such a role. But ambitions without resources are merely aspirations, just as a national security strategy without a complementary budget is just a wishlist. Romania’s government faces a stark contradiction: it has articulated a bold strategic vision while simultaneously cutting the institutions needed to achieve it. Bucharest cannot have it both ways. If Romania truly wants to become a regional power, it has to start investing like one. Otherwise it will remain what it has long been: a country with considerable potential, perpetually punching below its weight.
Check out all of Small Wars Journal’s great content.
The post Romania Aims To Be the Leading Power of Southeastern Europe. But Who Will Pay for It? appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.