Strategy??

Tactics without strategy is noise before defeat. At present, the American people are observing allegedly successful tactics in the monitoring and destruction of alleged drug running boats in the Caribbean and Pacific. The Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard are intercepting oil tankers of the so-called Russian “Shadow Fleet” while conducting a selective blockade of Venezuela. We also witnessed a remarkably successful operation to track and capture Nicolas Maduro. We are unsure if the purpose of these operations – discrete strikes against fleeting target – is the protection of the American people from the scourge of illegal narcotics or, as others opine, the removal of Maduro from the regime in Venezuela and access to Venezuelan oil. There are a series of questions we should be asking our government leaders, our military leaders, and our diplomats as we consider this situation. The answers to these questions will serve as a starting point for the continuous analysis that must accompany the execution of such operations. We all know the truth of the adage: no plan can look with certainty beyond initial contact with the enemy main body.

We must figure out; what is the problem we are (or this plan is) trying to solve? We must determine if it is the correct problem. We must determine that if we do this, what are we choosing not to do?

This is not simply a semantic argument. War and the use of force is and remains an extension of policy through other means. Policy must inform strategy and strategy must be the basis of the campaign plans and planning that guides the execution of tactical actions. All this effort must relate to the realization of U.S. policy objectives. If we disparage this process as “old think” and unrelated to modern problems, we yet again risk wasting tactical success gained by our force’s skill at arms, a core flaw of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, for example. We must define and constantly refine the linkage of tactical success to the purpose of our actions.

We must figure out; what is the problem we are (or this plan is) trying to solve? We must determine if it is the correct problem. We must determine that if we do this, what are we choosing not to do? We must consider the outcomes of success, to wit, if we succeed, what will we look like, what will our adversaries (or allies) look like, and what will the operating environment look like? Let us consider the problem.

The administration’s public statements directly relate to the interruption of the flow of illegal narcotics and migrants coming into the country. On December 18, 2025, the Washington Post reported that White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller’s larger goal for expanded U.S. military operations is reducing the flow of drugs and migrants into the United States. Miller believed that attacking drug cartels would diminish their power, thereby stabilizing Latin American countries and reducing the number of people risking the trek to the United States. The administration speaks of Mexican drug cartels as well cartels sponsored by the Venezuelan government. On November 29, 2025, the President posted on Truth Social:

The President signed an executive order on December 15, 2025 declaring fentanyl to be a weapon of mass destruction. On or about October 2, 2025, he notified Congress via a confidential memo that the United States is in a “non-international armed conflict” with drug cartels designated as terrorist organizations. He also stated that air and ground operations aimed at narcotics sites inside Venezuela will happen “soon.” The President also declared that, as of December 16, 2025, there is a “total and complete blockade of all sanctioned oil tankers” in and out of Venezuela. The President also demanded the return of oil that he claimed belonged to America. The problems the administration is apparently trying to “solve” are primarily undermining and replacing the Maduro regime in Venezuela in order to control Venezuelan oil reserves as well as interrupting the flow of narcotics into our country. This leads to consideration of the second question, is this the correct problem?

A complete strategy that protects the American people from the scourge of narcotics and makes the population healthy again should include a series of directed and funded programs designed to reduce the demand for narcotics.

The President states that his primary task is the security of the nation, its people, and its borders. He and his spokespeople assert that every boat – allegedly laden with narcotics – sunk saves 25,000 American lives. So, is just focusing on the supply side of the protection-of-the-people issue the correct problem? If the primary task is the protection of the people – especially as the administration also wants to make America healthy again, the stated portion of the problem – the administration should reconsider its focus on stopping the flow of narcotics. A complete strategy that protects the American people from the scourge of narcotics and makes the population healthy again should include a series of directed and funded programs designed to reduce the demand for narcotics. Therefore, a complete national strategy will require coordination of the Defense, Homeland Security, State, and Health and Human Services Departments, at a minimum. Given the inter-departmental nature of the challenge, executing this strategy will require oversight by the National Security Council. A complete governmental effort brings us to consider the question: if we develop, execute, and refine such a strategy, what are we, the government, choosing not to do?

What Aren’t We Doing?

Unless there are other activities going on in the Health and Human Services Department, it seems that what the administration is not choosing to do is address the demand for narcotics in the U.S. In accordance with the new National Security Strategy, the administration is choosing to focus on the western hemisphere. It also appears that the administration is choosing to not develop measures of effectiveness and performance in order to assess how well its strategy of interdiction is working. The administration is choosing to not inform the legislative branch of government about what the executive branch is doing in the name of the people. The administration is relying solely on presidential authority. Given this, what do we expect the outcome of successful execution of this strategy to look like?

Outcomes and Expectations

The first assumption on what success would look like would be a demonstrable reduction in the amount of illegal narcotics coming into the United States. By inference, there is an expectation of weakened drug cartels in the western hemisphere. From reading open source media, there is an expectation that the removal of Maduro and the further weakening of the Maduro regime in Venezuela will strengthen the U.S. and stabilize the Caribbean region. The interruption of Venezuelan support for the Communist regime in Cuba might lead to a further weakening of the regime’s hold on Cuba as well. The ultimate vision of success, expressed in the 2025 National Security Strategy, is a stronger position for the United States in the entirety of the western hemisphere.

The Trump administration and Secretary of State Rubio have long viewed the Maduro government not only as a leftist, authoritarian regime but also as the key element in a broad network of leftist governments in South and Central America. These governments undermine U.S. influence in the western hemisphere and assist the entry of Russian and Chinese soft power. The anticipated stronger position of the U.S. will contribute to global stability, a return of great power spheres of influence, and sustained trade.

Given the expectation of a stronger U.S. position in the western hemisphere – and potentially a stronger position in the world – then the expectation for our adversaries is a weaker position vis-a-vis the U.S., especially in the western hemisphere. The demonstration of decisive U.S. military power and the exercise of statecraft and economic power will complicate any adversary’s risk calculus. The National Security Strategy (which is really a policy statement) suggests a range of U.S. interests around the world. Given the assumption that U.S. operations in Venezuela are successful – given the strategy’s definition of “success” – such operations would lead to allies and adversaries recognizing that the U.S. will act in defense of its interests. Thus, all actors in the world will respect U.S. power and see it is in their best interest to support global stability through trade and open relationships between nations.

Thus, the expectation of this operating environment as a result of the successful conclusion of the U.S. campaign vis-a-vis Venezuela is the greater western hemisphere becoming a stable operating environment for all nations. There will be a return to the broad understanding that stronger powers will act in their interests, recognizing where these interests come into potential conflict with U.S. interests. This will lead to more diplomacy and deal-making. In short, a stable world where major powers recognize each other’s interests and consider, in some manner, the interests of other nations insofar as these interests coincide with their own.

This is the expectation implied in the National Security Strategy. Expectations require a strategy in order to become facts. The administration claims that this operation has legally been a war and – sometimes at odds – a counter-terrorist action, ultimately understood to be state-sponsored terrorism. This understanding lends itself to “phase IV” operations as well as transitions, branches, and sequels.

Final Thoughts

We must have more than a series of discrete, albeit successful, tactical operations.

From a close reading of only open-source documents; newspapers, media reports, etc., I do not see how these disparate, albeit quite successful, tactical actions translate to a coherent campaign plan in support of a strategy. Clearly there is work to be done by the Joint Staff and U.S. Southern Command, at the least. They must answer hard questions; how long does the nation keep a carrier strike group in the Caribbean? How do we end Operation Southern Spear? Producing exciting video clips of successful strikes on alleged drug boats is not enough.

This broad-brush attempt to answering these strategic questions combined with how the government is explaining this strategy and the progress of its implementation to the American people and the world at large, should, I offer, reinforce the need for a coherent strategy that is continuously assessed at the national level. We must have more than a series of discrete, albeit successful, tactical operations. Bearing the answers to these questions in mind, the National Security Council must link tactical actions to the realization of our policy objectives through the practice of strategy. As Clausewitz wrote, “The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect”.

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