War, bloodshed, and legitimacy: Is Iran witnessing another internal coup?

From the 1980s to today, moments of war and uncertainty have triggered internal consolidation in Iran

Originally published on Global Voices

In the aftermath of recent mass killings in Iran, the atmosphere inside the country shifted palpably. This time it was not only about political outrage or routine repression. There was shock. There was grief. And there was a silence that felt heavier than usual. In that silence, a phrase began circulating among some political insiders and observers: a “systemic coup.” Of course, contrary to the mentality created in Iran, this white coup was carried out more by conservatives, revolutionary forces, and those close to the leadership in Iran than by opponents of the regime.

This is not the first time. It has happened before during moments of extreme stress for the Islamic Republic. Even Supreme National Security Council secretary Ali Larijani alluded, in the context of the recent 12-day confrontation with Israel, to the need for internal recalibration under pressure. What some now call a systemic coup does not necessarily imply tanks in the streets. Rather, it suggests an internal reshuffling of authority — a quiet consolidation shaped by crisis.

The argument got more heated after reports that Israeli airstrikes killed a number of high-ranking Iranian military leaders. Questions about deterrence and foreign policy suddenly became irrelevant. Discussions on social media grew to include errors in intelligence, unclear networks of patronage, and claims of corruption in parts of the military and security system.  Online debates started to bring up names like Ali Shamkhani repeatedly. Official institutions denied wrongdoing, but the fact that these claims were so public showed that there was a deeper problem: a breach in the perception of unity.

At the same time, the government’s legitimacy appears more fragile than before. Many Iranians are not analyzing strategy; they are mourning. Conversations have shifted from geopolitics to disbelief, and families are still processing news that feels destabilizing both personally and nationally. Executions continue, and reports of repression have not ceased. In such an atmosphere, any elite restructuring takes place under the weight of public mistrust—a markedly different environment from the revolutionary fervor of the 1980s.

Looking back to the late 1980s

This is not the first time Iran has faced a convergence of war, uncertainty, and leadership transition. During the final years of the Iran–Iraq War, the country was exhausted—militarily and economically. Khomeini's health was deteriorating. Acceptance of UN Resolution 598 marked not only the end of a brutal war but also the beginning of a new political question: what would happen next?

The 1988 mass executions of political prisoners remain one of the most debated episodes in modern Iranian history. At the time, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who had been designated as Khomeini’s successor, protested the killings. His objections did not end quietly; they contributed to his eventual removal from the line of  succession. Years later, the release of audio recordings from internal meetings suggested that power consolidation had been underway well before his formal dismissal.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, who played an important role in the Islamic Revolution and was one of the key figures in electing Ali Khamenei as leader, had memoirs from the mid-1980s hint at conversations about potential leadership transition and even collective decision-making proposals. Succession was not an abstract fear—it was already being negotiated behind closed doors.  French diplomat Christian Graeff, who served as ambassador to Iran between 1988 and 1991, later published a book recounting conversations he claimed took place in 1988. In it, Mohammad Javad Larijani, a member of the influential Larijani family in the power structure of the Islamic Republic, reportedly spoke of a “white coup” designed to curb Khomeini’s ultimate authority and pivot Iran toward ceasefire and diplomatic normalization.

Whether Graeff’s account is fully reliable remains debated. But the mere fact that such conversations were recorded by a foreign diplomat underscores how intensely the question of authority was contested in Khomeini’s final years.

A pattern that never quite disappears

The Islamic Republic’s early history was turbulent. The resignation of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan’s provisional government sidelined nationalist-religious currents. The 1981 bombing of the Islamic Republic Party headquarters, which killed Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti and many senior officials, reshaped the political order almost overnight.

The bombing was officially attributed to opposition militants, yet its aftermath facilitated the rapid tightening of security structures. Other traumatic events followed. Suspicious airplane crashes involving senior military figures during wartime. Broad purges within the army and later within segments of the Revolutionary Guard. In the late 1990s, the so-called chain murders of intellectuals—crimes eventually attributed to rogue elements within the Ministry of Intelligence—reignited debates over “internal elimination.”

Deaths of prominent political figures have often generated questions that linger. Former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani died in 2017, and the cause was officially declared cardiac arrest, but some family members publicly sought greater clarity. Ahmad Khomeini's death in 1995. The son of Ayatollah Khomeini, he was one of those who had the chance to succeed him and was known as the treasure trove of secrets of the Islamic system. His death, which was similarly blamed on heart disease, is still a politically sensitive topic for certain people. Official answers have held up, but doubt remains.

The house detention of Mir Hossein Mousavi, former Iranian prime minister, who remains under house arrest today, and Mehdi Karroubi, who was under house arrest along with Mousavi after the Green Movement and has recently been released, also show this. Following the 2009 protests, people thought even more that dealing with crises often means keeping internal enemies in check instead of reconciling with them. Reformist leaders are still being pushed out of politics or facing legal problems.

Weaponized history and ideological consolidation

The 1986 Iran–Contra affair wasn't the only time Iran and its enemies used secret or semi-secret routes to talk to each other. Over the years, there have been times when open animosity and indirect conversations have happened at the same time.

Reports say that Iranian and U.S. officials worked together a little bit on Afghanistan in the early 2000s. Later, secret talks in Oman led to the 2015 nuclear deal. Even when there were public fights, regional security issues have typically required indirect contacts or mediated agreements.

This lengthy history of fighting and negotiating at the same time is the larger framework in which people in Iran today understand rumors of meetings or covert talks. Historical narratives have transformed into instruments in modern political conflict. Hassan Abbasi, who is renowned for his strong ideological views and ties to pro-Supreme Leader groups, made statements regarding a supposed encounter between Hassan Rouhani, the former moderate Iranian president who sees himself as a chance to succeed Ali Khamenei, and Israeli counterterrorism official Amiram Nir in 1986.

Critics see these kinds of actions as efforts to strengthen a Khamenei-centered story while denigrating reformist opponents. Supporters say they bring to light things that are not obvious. History in Iran rarely remains neutral, frequently serving political purposes.

War, succession, and public grief

Israel's June 2025 attack and the alleged deaths of high-ranking officers have brought back memories of the late 1980s, when there was a lot of pressure from outside the country to go to war and a lot of confusion about who was in charge. But Iran today is not the same as it was in 1988. The zeal for revolution has evaporated. Hard times are quite bad. The Supreme Leader is getting older. The ways that succession works are still unclear. And maybe most crucially, people don't trust the government anymore.

The tragic murders caused more than just political shockwaves. For many Iranians, they felt like a break. Sadness and worry blended together. While the elites talk about recalibration, regular people are still dealing with loss and feeling weak. In this emotional climate, the term “systemic coup” not only serves as a political theory but also raises concerns about potential hidden agendas.

It is still not obvious if a concerted internal restructuring is really happening. But history shows that when the Islamic Republic is going through many problems at once, like war, succession, and legitimacy strain, power doesn't often change hands through open competition. It makes changes to itself, sometimes gradually and sometimes decisively. At times, this situation results in a state of misery characterized by foreign and internal war, along with widespread mismanagement that we often overlook.

On one hand, there is a massacre and a corrupt system; on the other hand, there is foreign intervention and a future resembling that of its neighbors, all while the people lack the right to choose, resulting in self-inflicted misery.

Today, as military confrontation, ideological consolidation, elite rivalry, and social fracture converge, Iran appears once again at an inflection point. The question is not simply whether there is a coup or not. The question is whether the system is preparing to reshape itself—before events reshape it instead.

The pattern does not suggest chaos. It suggests something more structured: when under stress, the system tightens internally. Is it really shrinking, or is it trying to increase repression and the shadow of war with another white coup?