In Central Asia, Washington must replace episodic symbolism with a sustained economic, legal, and supply-chain strategy. 

Washington has a habit of chasing symbols when it should be building systems. Greenland is a symbol: icy, strategic, dramatic, and easy to explain in one sentence. Central Asia is a system: less theatrical, more complicated, and vastly more important for the next decade of geopolitical competition. If the United States is serious about reducing strategic dependence on China and managing long-term competition with Russia, it should stop treating Central Asia as a periodic talking point and start treating it as a standing priority—beginning with Kazakhstan.

Central Asia lies at the intersection of Russia and China and along the main overland routes between Europe and Asia. It is rich in strategic commodities, and Kazakhstan, in particular, is central to discussions of uranium and broader minerals. In other words, supply-chain resilience and geopolitical resilience are now the same conversation.

Yet US policy has not kept pace with US rhetoric. No US president has ever visited Central Asia while in office—a revealing gap in American statecraft. Multiple policy analyses have argued that this is an obvious imbalance Washington could correct with a presidential trip, and they are right about the signal such a move would send. But even advocates of that step acknowledge its limits: a first-ever visit would be strategically meaningful, yet still largely symbolic unless it is backed by sustained policy, commercial tools, and institutional follow-through.

The most recent publicly established US regional strategy framework was the 2019–2025 strategy published in 2020. Congressional research still points to that document as the baseline architecture for US objectives in the region. As of late 2025, officials pointed to that same framework as the publicly available strategy and did not publicly detail an updated replacement on request. Whether one calls this a transition period or a strategy gap, the practical result is the same: the region sees episodic engagement, not a sustained doctrine.

That inconsistency is costly because demand-side pressure is rising fast. The IEA reports strong recent growth in demand for key transition minerals and warns that supply-chain concentration risks remain severe. It also projects that concentration in refining will remain heavily tilted toward China for several key materials well into the next decade. This means the United States cannot diversify only by identifying new mines; it must build multi-country value chains that include processing, logistics, finance, and offtake certainty. That kind of architecture is exactly where Central Asia can matter – if Washington chooses to build it.

To be fair, the United States is not inactive. The C5+1 format has matured institutionally, and the November 2025 summit in Washington signaled higher-level political attention. Deals were announced, and US officials framed the region as strategically important for mineral diversification and broader economic connectivity. This was useful. But one summit, even at the leadership level, does not substitute for a durable policy mechanism with clear timelines, financing tools, and congressional follow-through—countries in the region track implementation, not atmospherics.

Take the legal and trade architecture. Congress has begun moving in the right direction: HR1024 (introduced in February 2025) seeks to terminate Jackson-Vanik application to Kazakhstan and authorize permanent normal trade relations, noting Kazakhstan has operated under a temporary status for decades. The diagnosis is correct. But as of the latest action listed, the bill remains at the introduced stage in committee. A bipartisan Senate push to remove outdated Jackson-Vanik barriers for Central Asia underscores that momentum exists—but momentum is not policy until enacted.

Meanwhile, competitors are not waiting. Russia continues active top-level diplomacy with Central Asian states and openly pushes deeper trade ties. China remains deeply embedded through market access, financing, and supply-chain absorption capacity. Europe, for its part, is putting real money behind trans-Caspian connectivity, including a €10 billion commitment linked to corridor development. The World Bank has already modeled how corridor investments and efficiency reforms could cut transit times by half and potentially triple trade flows by 2030. In strategic terms, the board is moving, whether Washington moves or not.

There is also a diplomatic principle that Washington should preserve: Central Asian states are not seeking to be “taken” from one side to the other. They are signaling that they want options. US policy works best when it supports sovereign optionality rather than demanding alignment tests that regional governments cannot and will not pass. The original C5+1 logic recognized this reality. A modernized strategy should do the same, but with real economic instruments attached.

Some in Washington will argue that the United States is overstretched and cannot prioritize every region. True. But this is precisely why prioritization should favor high-leverage theaters. Central Asia is one of them. Congressional research has long emphasized the region’s strategic geography and resource significance, and the US has already invested billions in assistance over three decades. The question now is not whether America has interests there; it is whether it can match those interests with policy continuity.

If Washington wants a realistic Eurasian strategy, it should begin with a simple correction: stop confusing episodic attention with durable statecraft. The path to resilient supply chains, greater strategic room relative to China, and a less permissive environment for Russian coercion runs through consistent partnerships, modern legal frameworks, and functional infrastructure.

About the Author: Miras Zhiyenbayev

Miras Zhiyenbayev is the advisor to the chairman of the Board for International Affairs and Initiatives at Maqsut Narikbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan. He was previously head of the Foreign Policy Analysis and International Studies Program at MIND, the Maqsut Narikbayev Institute for Networking and Development, a university-based think tank at Maqsut Narikbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan.

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