US Navy vessels can no longer dock at Israel’s northern port of Haifa without worrying that its Chinese-made cranes could be spying on them.

As the US continues to finalize its force buildup in the Middle East for a potential campaign against Iran, the USS Gerald R. Ford is expected to dock at Israel’s Port of Haifa. The port complex includes both an Israeli naval base and a new commercially operated cargo terminal situated alongside it. Critically, that commercial terminal is run by Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG), a Chinese state-owned enterprise.

Haifa is Israel’s largest port, and a logical place to service US naval assets. However, that US (and Israeli) naval assets could prepare for combat operations next to infrastructure operated by Beijing should raise eyebrows. Moreover, it should underscore the importance of previous US-led efforts to convince allies and partners like Israel to limit their reliance on and exposure to Chinese state-affiliated investment, especially concerning matters of national security.

Chinese Port Cranes Could Spy on American Ships

When Israel first awarded SIPG a $1.7 billion, 25-year contract in 2015 to operate the new port of Haifa, it prompted significant US concern. The FY2020 NDAA passed by the Senate noted that despite America’s interest in the “future forward presence of United States naval vessels at the Port of Haifa in Israel,” it had “serious security concerns” about China’s lease agreement there. In light of those concerns, it urged Israel to consider the security implications of Chinese foreign investment. The US Navy itself warned Israel that it might stop docking in Haifa once SIPG began its operations in 2021. That same year, the Biden administration pressed concerns over China’s role at the port with Israel, which reportedly refused to allow American inspections of the Chinese-built port.

America’s concerns were not unfounded. In 2024, the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party found that Chinese ZPMC cranes operating in multiple US ports contained cellular modems that could allow Chinese state access and espionage. The Haifa port utilizes eight ZPMC cranes, working autonomously to conduct port activities, which should draw similar scrutiny over the concerns identified in the US. China’s 2017 national security law requires all Chinese companies to comply with state intelligence activities, including through data and intelligence sharing.

Nonetheless, US efforts prevented China from winning further bids in Israel. In tandem with its successful efforts to label China a serious strategic competitor to the US, the first Trump administration mounted a successful pressure campaign against Israel to form a CFIUS-like body to review inbound foreign investment in Israel. The Biden administration continued the push against Chinese investment, and the combined efforts paid off; since the board’s establishment in 2020, Chinese companies have stopped winning bids in Israel.

What Could China Learn from US Ships Docked in Haifa?

Despite this progress, the foothold that SIPG obtained still poses a threat. If naval assets call in Haifa during upcoming military operations against Iran, China has much to gain. In addition to the information Beijing has likely collected outside of conflict contingencies, SIPG’s presence in Haifa could allow it to collect information on how US naval assets operate in a conflict. The information could in turn impact China’s own defense planning, especially regarding a potential contest with the United States in East Asia. China could also pass along the information it collects to Iran, with which it maintains a 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership involving intelligence sharing, to weaken the impact of the impending US military campaign. While Chinese and Iranian interests do not perfectly align, they do converge in their desire to blunt American force projection.

Whether or not the Ford ultimately docks in Haifa, SIPG’s presence there should renew the initial concerns that arose during the first Trump administration, which remain true to this day at home and abroad. The US should encourage Israel to terminate or otherwise mitigate its current arrangement with SIPG in the port of Haifa as a precondition for the continued docking of US naval assets there. Israel has historically refused to do so, but the security risks now on display warrant a reconsideration. The United States should also continue to press Israel to conduct regular inspections of the Chinese-operated port. More broadly, the Trump administration should investigate continued exposure of US military assets to Chinese espionage, in Israel and elsewhere.

The potential for devastating impacts caused by China’s burrowing into critical US infrastructure still remains. And China poses an even greater threat today than in the first Trump term to supply chain security, national security, and US interests in the Indo-Pacific. Early in his second term, President Trump rightly fought to block Chinese control over critical maritime chokepoints in the Panama Canal. With no apparent plan to shield US naval assets that dock in Haifa, Trump should do the same here. 

About the Author: Emanuel Cohen

Emanuel Cohen is the program manager for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He focuses on US foreign policy, the Indo-Pacific, and on the threat that a rising China poses to the United States and its allies. Follow him on X: @MannyJCohen

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