Real North Korean Concessions: The Acid Test of the Upcoming Summits

Robert E Kelly

Security, Asia

It is a bit unnerving that the North has still not given the United States anything real to consider counter-conceding for.

This Friday, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will meet South Korean president Moon Jae-in. In May or June, he may meet U.S. President Trump. The hype around these meetings is growing. Just last week, North Korea’s announcement that it would suspend nuclear and missile tests sparked another round of hope that real change on the peninsula is near.

Expectations are rising, and without being recalcitrantly skeptical, things look better than they have in years. Rhetorically at least, North Korea has dropped its objections to the U.S.-South Korean alliance, the presence of U.S. forces, and even joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises. And now, it is throwing out a testing halt. Obviously all this must be verified, but for now this is movement in the right direction.

Importantly though, these are all what we might call “negative” concessions. They are, in North Korean eyes, certainly concessions. These are things they have insisted on as their right to act on or complain about for years. But critically, these concessions are provocative actions against the allies; they are not actually anything of direct, material value to the North, such as a shutdown of one its gulags or the entrance of inspectors into its nuclear sites.

Similarly, North Korea and South Korea have suggested other pseudo-concessions in the last few months as a part of any deal: family reunions of relations divided by separation and war, a reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Zone, and tours to Mt. Diamond, inter-Korean rail and other joint-economic projects.

These schemes may indeed be part of any deal in the summits, but it is critical to note that none of them actually impose costs on North Korea—the mark a genuine concession to solicit counter-concessions. And the economic projects will in fact materially benefit North Korea.

Giving up objections to the United States in South Korea, or provocations along the border, are hardly concessions at all. Pyongyang is surrendering the “right” to harass us, scarcely a serious give-back. Giving up testing is similarly hardly a concession. That is not a rollback of extent capabilities, only a vague promise not to generate even more destabilizing weapons.